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UA MAU KE EA 0 KA AINA I KA PONO:' VOTING RIGHTS AND
THE NATIVE HAWAIIAN SOVEREIGNTY PLEBISCITE
Troy M. Yoshino*
Using the Native Hawaiian Sovereignty Plebiscite to investigate the
complex interplay between race, nationalism, and the special purpose
district exception, this Note chronicles the development of relevant
legal doctrines and the history of the Native Hawaiians' quest for
self-government in an attempt to untangle those issues. In doing so,
this Note concludes that the Native Hawaiian Sovereignty Plebiscite
was an unconstitutional method of securing sovereign rights for
Native Hawaiians, but that a Native Hawaiian claim to at least some
form of self-government is justified. As a result, this Note searches
for a method that will guarantee self-government as well as
constitutionality and the recognition of all interests involved. It
proceeds to analyze various voting systems, administrative
mechanisms, and constitutional doctrines, and concludes by using this
analysis to design a process that balances democratic philosophies,
public interests, and the interests of Native Hawaiians who want
sovereignty.
t Loosely translated, the Hawaiian phrase, "Ua mau ke ea o ka aina i ka pono"
sends a prayer asking that the "life of the land be perpetuated in righteousness"
Originally coined by King Kamehameha III during the nineteenth century, it has
since become the official motto of the State of Hawaii. See HAW. CONST. preamble.
The Plebiscite that this Note examines is indicative of the larger sover-
eignty debate that threatens to alter the current state of Hawaiian society. See
James Podgers, Greetings from Independent Hawaii, A.B.A. J., June 1997, at 74, 75
("The sovereignty movement is 'inherently divisive' because it is based on racial
preferences that would give Hawaiians special rights."). Generally speaking, this
Note seeks to create a process that is constitutional by the American standard (and
thus protective of the 1.2 million American citizens present on Hawaiian soil), but
makes sure to preserve the interests of Native Hawaiians seeking sovereignty and
redress for the misappropriation of their lands by the United States government. It
does so because it feels that such a move is necessary to both resolving the current
dilemma and fulfilling the commands of the Hawaii State motto.
* Executive Editor, Michigan Journal of Race & Law, Volume 3, 1997-98. B.A.
1995, Pomona College; J.D. expected 1998, University of Michigan Law School.
Truman Scholar.
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fondest "aloha," however, goes out to my family, David S. Yoshino, Eileen M.
Yoshino, and Erin Y. Yoshino. For their support and love, I am eternally grateful.
This Note is dedicated to them.
Michigan Journal of Race & Law
IN TRO D U CTIO N ................................................................................... 476
I. THE NATIVE HAWAIIAN SOVEREIGNTY MOVEMENT ....................... 480
A . H istorical Background .................................................................. 480
B. The Campaign for Sovereignty ..................................................... 483
C. The Native Hawaiian Plebiscite ................................................... 486
II. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES RAISED BY THE NATIVE
H AWAIIAN PLEBISCITE ....................................................................... 487
A . Voting Rights Issues .................................................................... 487
1. Rice v. Cayetano-A Backdrop for Voting
Rights Litigation ................................................................. 488
2. Reynolds v. Sims-The "One Person, One
Vote" Principle ........... * .................................................. 489
3. The Special Purpose District Exception .......................... 490
4. Justice Powell's "Political Process" Exception
to the "One Person, One Vote" Standard ......................... 492
5. Why "One Person, One Vote" Should Be Applied
to the Native Hawaiian Sovereignty Plebiscite .............. 493
B. The Equal Protection Clause-Does it Change This
Voting Rights A nalysis? .............................................................. 502
1. Analogies to Affirmative Action ...................................... 503
2. Vote Dilution and Majority-Minority
D istrict C ases ....................................................................... 505
III. FINDING AN ADEQUATE SOLUTION .................................................. 506
A. Step One-Deciding Whether to Emphasize
"Process" or "Substance". .......................................................... 507
B. The Proposed Process .................................................................... 511
C. Potential Constitutional Problems & Possible Solutions ............. 518
1. Fifteenth Amendment Concerns ...................................... 518
2. The White Primary Problem ............................................. 519
C O N C LU SIO N ........................................................................................ 520
A civilization progresses when what was viewed as a
misfortune becomes viewed as an injustice.'
INTRODUCTION
When millions of Americans went to the polls on November 5,
1996, to voice their opinions on a wide variety of high-profile issues
ranging from affirmative action (California Proposition 209) to the
tax exemption status of non-profit and religious organizations
1. See Martha Minow, Introduction to OUTSIDE THE LAW: NARRATIVES ON JUSTICE
IN AMERICA 1, 6 (Susan Richards Shreve & Porter Shreve eds., 1997) [hereinafter
OUTSIDE THE LAW] (quoting an unknown source).
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(Colorado Proposition 11),2 few voters missed the fact that an
initiative concerning the Native Hawaiian sovereignty movement
was absent from their ballots. But the issue of Hawaiian sovereignty,
ultimately affecting the future of Hawaii (home to nine U.S. military
installations, over a million Americans, and a burgeoning tourist
industry) as part of the United States,3 would seem to be much more
important to most Americans-regardless of where they reside-
than "[riestrictions or bans on the use of traps, bait or dogs in
hunting" (voted on in five states during election day: Colorado,
Idaho, Massachusetts, Michigan, and Washington).4
Harold F. Rice, a non-Hawaiian resident of the State of Ha-
waii, certainly considered the issue of Hawaiian sovereignty to be
an important one, and surely missed the initiative concerning the
future of the Hawaiian sovereignty movement when he saw that it
was absent from his election day ballot. In fact, Rice was infuriated
when he learned that the sovereignty movement had been cleared to
move forward without his input or the input of all but approxi-
mately 30,000 of Hawaii's 1.2 million residents. Harold Rice felt that
because all residents of Hawaii would be affected by any meaningful
form of redress through social and economic changes, all such
residents should decide whether delegates would be elected to a
constitutional convention that would determine the desired form of
a sovereign Hawaiian government. During the summer of 1996,
however, a Native Hawaiian Sovereignty Plebiscite was held, giving
only persons of Hawaiian ancestry a say on that very issue.
As a result, Rice filed a motion for a preliminary injunction in
the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii shortly
before the Plebiscite results were to be announced. The motion
requested that the results of the vote be withheld pending a trial to
determine the constitutionality of the Plebiscite and was based on
a belief that the Plebiscite results would cause irreparable harm to
the constitutional rights of Hawaii's residents-and perhaps all
2. See Robert Pear, Ballot Initiatives Around the Nation, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 7, 1996,
at B7. Overall, voters in twenty-three states were polled on a total of ninety different
initiatives. Peter Schrag, California, Here We Come: Government by Plebiscite Which
Would Have Horrified the Founding Fathers, Threatens to Replace Representative Govern-
ment, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1998, at 20 (noting that issues covered "everything
from hunting rights to gambling to logging regulations to sugar production to the
legalization of medical marijuana use.").
3. Hawaii, INCROSOFT ENCARTA (1997).
4. See Pear, supra note 2, at B7.
5. While some use the term "Hawaiian" to refer to residents of the State of
Hawaii in a manner analogous to "Californian" or "Michigander' I use the terms
"Hawaiian" and "Native Hawaiian" to refer only to the indigenous persons who are
descendants of those who lived in Hawaii before contact with British Naval Captain
James Cook in 1778. Others are referred to as "non-Hawaiians."
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Americans-if released. ' Among other things, the motion argued
that the "one person, one vote" principle of Reynolds v. Sims7 meant
that when Rice was not allowed to vote in the Native Hawaiian
Plebiscite, his constitutional rights to equal protection and to the
franchise under the Voting Rights Act, and the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments were abridged.8
Rice's motion eventually was denied on the grounds of a
special purpose district exception to the "one person, one vote"
principle. That exception allows elections that concern issues involv-
ing only limited governmental authority and that disproportionately
affect certain groups to be limited to members of those groups.9 But
this Note argues that the special purpose district exception should not
apply to the Native Hawaiian Sovereignty Plebiscite because that
election circumvents constitutional regulations on the political process.
Moreover, the decisions and legitimacy generated by the initiative
have the potential to substantially affect many groups other than the
Native Hawaiians who were granted the right to vote in the Plebi-
scite.
The positive result of the Plebiscite at issue in Rice v. Cayetano°
means that further steps to establish sovereignty are imminent and, in
some cases, are already occurring." As the campaign for sovereignty
6. Rice's motion was considered in Rice v. Cayetano, 941 F. Supp. 1529 (D. Haw.
1996).
7. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
8. Rice, 941 F. Supp. at 1536.
9. See, e.g., Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S.
719, 728-30 (1973).
10. On September 11, 1996, the Hawaiian Sovereignty Elections Council (HSEC)
announced that 73.3% (22,294 out of the 30,423 valid ballots) of all eligible persons
(i.e., Native Hawaiians over 18 years of age) voting in the Plebiscite voted "yes."
Walter Wright, Hawaiians Vote Yes, HONOLULU ADVERTISER, Sept. 12, 1996, at Al. By
voting "yes;' these Hawaiians opted to (1) elect delegates to a convention that will
propose the form of a Native Hawaiian government, and (2) move toward some
form of sovereignty for Native Hawaiians. See Rice, 941 F. Supp. at 1536.
11. A non-profit group called Ha Hawaii has organized with the goal of raising
some of the more than $8 million needed for further sovereignty elections and the
Native Hawaiian convention called for by the Plebiscite. Hawaiian Sovereignty Council
Expires, Assoc. PRESS POL. SERv., Dec. 31, 1996, at 1, available in 1996 WL 5430305
[hereinafter Expires].
The next phase of the process calls for 100 to 200 Hawaiian delegates to be
elected to a constitutional convention. Further Sovereignty Discussions Set for February,
OJIBWE NEWS, Dec. 20, 1996, at 2, available in 1996 WL 15812582 [hereinafter Further
Discussions]. In the meantime, HSEC plans for the formation of a research group that
would collect information about possible forms of government. HAWAIIAN SOV-
EREIGNTY ELECTIONS COUNCIL, To BUILD A NEW NATION (Ho'oKuKuKULu HE
AUPUNI Hou) (n.d.), at 6. These things would allow a proposal for a sovereign
Hawaiian government to be in place by March 1999, and for a subsequent vote by
Native Hawaiians on the ratification of that proposal to follow shortly thereafter.
Id.; Further Discussions, supra, at 2.
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moves forward, however, more and more individuals are likely
to recognize that any form of meaningful redress will affect the
interests of many individuals who are not Native Hawaiians.
This Note argues that unless something is done to change the
structure of the sovereignty process, these combined circum-
stances almost guarantee that the voting rights issues of Rice v.
Cayetano will be litigated again. Recognizing this, and contending
that the current process is unconstitutional, this Note proposes an
alternative decision-making process for determinations related to
the issue of Native Hawaiian sovereignty.
Although the focus of this Note is on voting rights and alter-
native electoral systems, its first Part gives some historical
background on the improper annexation of the Hawaiian Kingdom
by the United States and the developing movement to reclaim
Hawaiian sovereignty. In doing so, it does not attempt to provide a
comprehensive discussion of Hawaii's history or expound on
sovereignty and its merits or disadvantages. Rather, this Note
draws on history in an attempt to recognize the legitimacy of
requests for some form of redress, to analyze the types of reform
that Native Hawaiians desire, and to focus on the practical (rather
than the academic or doctrinal) difficulties of designing a decision-
making process that protects the interests of all parties potentially
affected by Native Hawaiian sovereignty.
12
Part II of this Note analyzes voting rights issues raised by the
Native Hawaiian Sovereignty Plebiscite and attempts to answer
the question of whether the right to vote in an election concerning
Native Hawaiian sovereignty can or should be limited to individu-
als of Hawaiian ancestry. It concludes that such a limitation is
impermissible-in other words, that the Rice court misapplied
Reynolds and the special purpose district exception-and that other
existing doctrines do nothing to change the unconstitutional status
of the existing decision-making structure. Given Part I's conclusion
about the legitimacy of Hawaiian requests for redress, however,
this Note also recognizes the need for a forum in which those
It is significant to note that most of the relevant literature on the topic
fails to define exactly how the sovereignty process will work after the Native
Hawaiians reach some form of consensus on sovereignty. Specifically, it is
unknown at this time whether the status quo demands that the sovereignty
issue ultimately be decided by the general population of Hawaii or the Hawaii
State Legislature.
12. Cf. Philip P. Frickey, Adjudication and Its Discontents: Coherence and
Conciliation in Federal Indian Law, 110 HARv. L. REV. 1754, 1757 (1997) ("[Unless
injected with a heavy dose of historical perspective and legal realism, formal
lawyerly analysis not only often fails to illuminate the issues ... ,but can also
result in deceiving conclusions.").
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requests can at least be heard within the political process. Part III,
therefore, goes on to suggest a procedure that should pass constitu-
tional muster and adequately balance the interests of Native
Hawaiians, the residents of the State of Hawaii, and the United
States government.
I. THE NATIvE HAWAIAN SOVEREIGNTY MOVEMENT
A. Historical Background
Although historians are uncertain about exactly how long
Native Hawaiians have inhabited their island home,' they mark
the arrival of the first haole," Captain James Cook of the British
Navy, on January 19, 1778, as the day that the course of Hawaiian
civilization changed forever."5 Word of the abundant sandalwood,
beautiful beaches, rich agricultural soils, and enormous economic
opportunities available in Hawaii spread quickly. By the 1840s, the
United States had not only discovered the virtues of the island
paradise for itself, but had also set its eye toward all-out domination
of the islands and its people. 6
A combination of religious, political, and economic forces en-
abled Americans to enter the Hawaiian national government and
exert strong influence over the monarchy. 7 By 1887, these outsiders
13. Good archeological estimates say that Hawaiian civilization is approximately
2000 years old. Shirley Streshinsky, Hawaiian Renaissance: From Traditional Polynesian
Voyaging Canoes to Herbal Medicines and Chanting, Hawaiian Culture Is Making a
Comeback, S.F. EXAMINER, Apr. 6, 1997, at Ti.
14. "Haole" is the Hawaiian word for "foreigner" (i.e., non-Hawaiian). HELENA G.
ALLEN, THE BETRAYAL OF LjLIUoKALANi 13 (1982).
15. See HAUNANI-KAY TRASK, FROM A NATIVE DAUGHTER: COLONIALISM AND
SOVEREIGNTY IN HAWAI'I 6-7 (1993).
16. Haunani-Kay Trask notes:
President John Tyler enunciated the infamous Tyler doctrine of
1842 which asserted to European powers that Hawai'i was in the
"U.S. sphere of influence" and therefore off-limits to European in-
terventions. The U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs,
meanwhile, replied to the Tyler doctrine with a Manifest Destiny
statement suggesting "Americans should acknowledge their own
interests" in Hawai'i as a "virtual right of conquest" over the
"mind and heart" of the Hawaiian people.
Id. at8.
17. The story chronicling the overthrow of the Hawaiian monarchy is too replete
with diplomatic maneuverings and deceptions to be fully laid out in this Note, but
comprehensive accounts of the annexation can be found in ALLEN, supra note 14;
MICHAEL DOUGHERTY, TO STEAL A KINGDOM (1992); NATIVE HAWAIIANS STUDY
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had gained effective control over the government by means of the
"Bayonet Constitution"-a document in which King Kalakaua, the
reigning monarch, ceded much of his power to Americans and
disenfranchised about seventy-five percent of the Native Hawaiian
population via an income and property ownership requirement that'
was too stringent for all but the most privileged indigenous persons
to meet. 8
On January 17, 1893, at the urging of American businessmen
who were irked by increasing sugar tariffs and Queen Lili'uokalani's19
threat to amend the Hawaiian constitution to increase the monarchy's
power, a group of pro-annexationist Americans known as the
"Committee of Safety" seized control of the Hawaiian government.
2
0
Backed by 160 armed United States Marines mobilized under the
direction of United States Minister John L. Stevens, American
revolutionaries seized Iolani Palace and declared a provisional
government.2 1 Although Minister Stevens acted throughout this
entire incident without presidential approval, he immediately
recognized the provisional government on behalf of the United
States.u This recognition gave the insurrectionists some much-
needed legitimacy and allowed them to declare the abolition of the
Hawaiian national government, expropriate the Crown lands
without compensation to the Queen, and place the Queen herself
under house arrest.2
Confronted by a provisional government that was backed
by the United States and an occupying U.S. military force that
was assembling near her palace, Lili'uokalani relinquished her
COMMISSION, REPORT ON THE CuLTuRE, NEEDS AND CONCERNS OF NATiVE HAWAIIANS
(1983) [hereinafter NEEDS]; TRASK, supra note 15, at 4-21.
18. See NEEDS, supra note 17, at 277 (noting that Article 31 of the Hawaiian
constitution was amended in 1887 to cede much of the King's power to his cabinet of
American outsiders); Bradley Hideo Keikiokalani Cooper, Comment, A Trust Divided
Cannot Stand-An Analysis of Native Hawaiian Land Rights, 67 TEMP. L. REV. 699, 704
(1994); Michael M. McPherson, Comment, Trustees of Hawaiian Affairs v. Yamasaki
and the Native Hawaiian Claim: Too Much of Nothing, 21 ENVTL. L. 453, 460-61 (1991);
Ron Staton, Injustice of 1893 Hawaii Overthrow Evident in 'Last Queen,' PORTLAND
OREGONIAN, Jan. 27, 1997, at C8.
19. With King Kalakaua's death in 1891, Queen Lili'uokalani ascended to the
throne. See NEEDS, supra note 17, at 292.
20. See id. at 293-94; Jennifer M.L. Chock, One Hundred Years of Illegitimacy:
International Legal Analysis of the Illegal Overthrow of the Hawaiian Monarchy, Hawaii's
Annexation, and Possible Reparations, 17 U. HAW. L. REV. 463, 465 (1995).
21. See 3 RALPH S. KUYKENDALL, THE HAWAIIAN KINGDOM 1874-1893, at 582-605
(1967).
22. See id.
23. See id. at 465; see also Mililani B. Trask, Historical and Contemporary Hawaiian
Self-Determination: A Native Hawaiian Perspective, 8 ARiz. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 77 (1991)
(giving a more complete historical account of Hawaii's annexation).
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authority-not to the provisional government, but to the United
24
States. She wrote:
I, Liliuokalani, by the Grace of God and under the
Constitution of the Kingdom, Queen, do hereby sol-
emnly protest against any and all acts done against
myself and the constitutional government of the
Hawaiian Kingdom by certain persons claiming to
have established a provisional government of and for
this Kingdom. That I yield to the superior force of the
United States of America, whose minister plenipoten-
tiary, His Excellency John L. Stevens, has caused
United States troops to be landed at Honolulu and
declared that he would support the said provisional
government. Now to avoid any collision of armed
forces and perhaps the loss of life, I do under this
protest, and impelled by said force, yield my author-
ity until such time as the Government of the United
States shall, upon the facts being presented to it,
undo the action of its representatives and reinstate
me in the authority which I claim as the constitu-
tional sovereign of the Hawaiian Islands.2
Hearing her protest and sympathizing with her plight,
President Grover Cleveland denounced the actions of Minister
Stevens and refused to submit a treaty of annexation to the United
States Senate, 6 but his successor, President William McKinley,
supported the annexation of Hawaii and tirelessly pushed the
Senate to move in that direction.27 Finally, five years after the
overthrow of Queen Lili'uokalani, the United States passed the
Annexation Act of 1898,2 and on August 12 of that year, the flag of
the Hawaiian nation that flew at Iolani Palace was lowered for the
last time. It was then "cut into small ribbons and given to the sons
and daughters of the missionary families as tokens of their victory
over the Hawaiian kingdom."'
24. See TRASK, supra note 15, at 17.
25. JAMES BLOUNT, REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER TO THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS 120
(1893) (quoting letter from Queen Lili'uokalani to Sanford B. Dole, Provisional
Governor of Hawaii (Jan. 17, 1893)).
26. See ROGER BELL, LAST AMONG EQUALS: HAWAIIAN STATEHOOD AND
AMERICAN PoLITIcs 28-29 (1984).
27. NEEDS, supra note 17, at 299-301.
28. Act of July 7, 1898, 30 Stat. 750.
29. Staton, supra note 18, at C8.
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B. The Campaign for Sovereignty
While the United States government has recognized its
mistakes in improperly overthrowing the Hawaiian govern-
ment,o it has taken only a few token steps toward correcting
these mistakes." In response to this apathy, Native Hawaiians
have become more active and more vocal in their search for
redress and sovereignty.
Their campaign for self-government first gained prominence
in 1976, when a group of activists occupied Kaho'olawe, an
uninhabited island that the United States Navy used as a bombing
range. 2 Today, approximately forty sovereignty organizations are
involved in the drive to reclaim lands lost to the United States
government.' Haunani-Kay Trask, a professor at the University of
30. See Pub. L. No. 103-150, 107 Stat. 1510 (1993) (stating that Congress
"acknowledge[s] the 100th anniversary of the January 17, 1893, overthrow of the
Kingdom of Hawaii, and... offers an apology to Native Hawaiians on behalf of
the United States for the overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii"); Chock, supra note
20, at 465-66 (noting that a commission appointed by President Grover Cleveland
concluded that the United States was responsible for the ousting of Queen
Lili'uokalani and that President Cleveland even recommended reinstating the
queen); Susan Essoyan, Hawaiian Firm Says History Decrees Land Sales Invalid, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 20, 1997, at A5; Adam Pertman, Native Hawaiians Seek Self-Rule,
BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 20, 1996, at 1, available in 1996 WL 6854172.
It is perhaps also significant to note that many non-Hawaiians view per-
sons of Hawaiian ancestry as entitled to some compensation for their
maltreatment by the United States government. See, e.g., Mari J. Matsuda, Looking
to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323,
372 n.208 (1987) (citing the results of a study concluding that an overwhelming
number of individuals view at least some type of program to address the wrongs
inflicted on Native Hawaiians as appropriate); Eric K. Yamamoto, Rethinking
Alliances: Agency, Responsibility and Interracial Justice, 3 ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 33, 39
(1995) (reporting that a number of Asian American groups in Hawaii wanted
apologies and multimillion dollar reparations for Native Hawaiians).
31. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 103-126, at 35 (1993) (stating that the "enactment of [Pub.
L. No. 103-150] will not result in any changes in existing law").
Some argue that redress is impossible because actual damages or specific
performance directed at remedying years of legal wrongs could surpass the revenue
and assets of the State of Hawaii. See CHARLES R. LAWRENCE Ill & MARI J. MATSUDA,
WE WON'T Go BACK: MAKING THE CASE FOR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 241 (1997).
Professors Lawrence and Matsuda discount this argument by pointing to reparations
paid to Japanese Americans for their wrongful internment during World War II. See
id. at 241-42. "The practical reality is that no litigant will ever collect full damages if
they will bankrupt the state. At some point the political process will have to allow
for compromise." Id. at 241.
32. See Mindy Pennybacker, Should the Aloha State Say Goodbye? Natives Wonder,
NATION, Aug. 12,1996, at 21.
33. See Luis H. Francia, Ka Lahui Hawai'i: After 100 Years of Colonialism, the
Hawaiian Sovereignty Movement Stirs, VILLAGE VOICE, June 20,1995, at 31.
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Hawaii-Manoa and a noted sovereignty expert and activist observes
that
[a]t the largest level, discussions of Hawaiian sov-
ereignty entail a choice between self-governing
structures: a completely independent Hawai'i under
the exclusive or predominating control of Hawaiians;
"limited sovereignty" on a specified land base ad-
ministered by a representative council but subject to
U.S. federal regulations; legally incorporated land
based units within existing communities linked by a
common elective council; a "nation-within-a-nation"
on the model of American Indian nations.
Just what "Hawaiian sovereignty" means more specifically,
however, is "nebulous.''" Several leading voices claim to represent
the approximately 200,000 Native Hawaiians (kanaka maoli) who
trace their ancestries back to the original inhabitants of Hawaii. 4 The
largest of these groups is Ka Lahui Hawai'i, which has declared itself
the government for Native Hawaiians and wants to create a "nation-
within-a-nation" with dual citizenships.37 Despite the fact that it is
It would be a mistake, however, to assume that all Hawaiians want sover-
eignty. In fact, quite the contrary is true. See Stella Danker, Rumblings of Discontent in
Hawaii, Bus. TIMES (Singapore), Dec. 24, 1996, at 1, available in 1996 WL 6296416 ("A
lot of Hawaiians don't want sovereignty because they feel that it will turn [Hawaii]
into a banana republic."); Podgers, supra note t, at 78 (quoting Mililani Trask, leader
of the sovereignty group Ka Lahui Hawai'i, as observing that most Hawaiians "are not
worried about independence. They're worried about paying the bills."); cf. Todd S.
Purdum, Hawaiians Angrily Turn on a Fabled Empire, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1997, at Al
(demonstrating that Native Hawaiians remain largely and bitterly divided over what
to do with entitlements that they already possess through a discussion regarding
allegations of mismanagement against the Bishop Estate, a trust organization
established to benefit Native Hawaiians).
34. TRASK, supra note 15, at 48; see also Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on
Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281, 1290 (1991) ("Nationhood is a concept
defined, ostensibly at least, by those included in it, not in any state of nature....
Legal recognition as sovereign is thus based on neither correspondence nor distinc-
tion, but on an equal entitlement to self-determination."); Podgers, supra note t, at 78
(quoting Clayton Hee, Chairman of the Board of Trustees for the Office of Hawaiian
Affairs, as defining the general contours of sovereignty to include "the right to self-
determination, the right to make [your] own rules, to choose leaders and to change
both [sic] as appropriate;" also noting that a better definition is impossible because
sovereignty is "amorphous-an unquantifiable, shapeless concept").
35. Meki Cox, Federal Court Case Could Nix Native Hawaiian Sovereignty Movement,
Assoc. PRESS, Aug. 31, 1996, at 1, available in 1996 WL 4438206.
36. See Pennybacker, supra note 32, at 21. In truth, depending on whose defini-
tion of "Hawaiian" you use, Native Hawaiians make up between 12% and 20% of the
State's 1.2 million residents. According to the statutory definition of "Hawaiian:'
found in HAw. REV. STAT. § 10-2 (1996), the number is closer to 20%.
37. See Cox, supra note 35, at 1.
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not recognized as legitimate by the government of the State of
Hawaii, Ka Lahui still claims over 21,000 registered citizens, has an
elected legislature, and is governed by a ratified constitution.' Ka
Lahui
argues for federal recognition of Hawaiian sover-
eignty, including claims to self-determination on an
identifiable land base[,] ... opposes all efforts by [the
Office of Hawaiian Affairs] to settle for money rather
than land[,] ... [and] argues that Hawaiians should
have standing to sue for breaches of trust in both state
and federal courts. 39
Another major sovereignty group, Pu'uhonua (also known as
"the Nation of Hawaii"), claims approximately 13,000 members,
wants to reinstate the Hawaiian monarchy, and argues for the return
of lands that they say rightfully belong to Native Hawaiians.40 In the
early 1990s, Pu'uhonua received several acres of land in Waimanalo,
Oahu, from the State of Hawaii as part of a settlement agreement
that helped move a Pu'uhonua encampment away from one of
Oahu's more popular tourist beaches.4 ' Today, it uses that land base
to operate a virtually self-sufficient agrarian society, complete-
much to the dismay of the State government-with license plates
and civil disobedients who refuse to recognize the law of either the
United States or the State of Hawaii.4
A third group, Ka Pakaukau, advocates a return to pre-Western
civilization, secession from the United States, and ejection of all non-
Hawaiians, including tourists, from the islands.4
At base, however, most groups recognize that any form of
meaningful Native Hawaiian sovereignty would involve sweeping
changes from the status quo and would substantially affect the lives
of most Americans, especially the residents of Hawaii. For example,
38. See Pennybacker, supra note 32, at 21.
39. TRASK, supra note 15, at 48.
40. See id. at 21.
41. Pu'uhonua had set up its original encampment at Makapu'u Beach in
Waimanalo, Oahu. It did so in order to strengthen its claim that the lands at
Makapu'u really belonged to Native Hawaiians and had been wrongfully misappro-
priated by the State of Hawaii.
42. See William H. Rodgers, Jr., The Sense of Justice and the Justice of Sense:
Native Hawaiian Sovereignty and the Second "Trial of the Century," 71 WASH. L. REV.
379, 380-81 (1996); id. at 384 (noting that leaders of Pu'uhonua have previously
been convicted of harboring fugitives from the force of U.S. law); Podgers, supra
note t, at 76 (discussing Pu'uhonua in the context of their leader, Dennis "Bumpy"
Kanahele).
43. See Cox, supra note 35, at 1.
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a number of sovereignty groups want to return almost two million
acres of public land-about half the total acreage of all the islands
combined-within the current boundaries of the State of Hawaii to
the control of Native Hawaiians.A These lands include approxi-
mately 400,000 acres under federal control, most significantly the
land comprising and surrounding the Pearl Harbor Naval Base; 1.35
million acres under the control of the State of Hawaii, including the
land where the Honolulu International Airport is situated; and
203,500 acres that Congress set aside in 1921 to provide homesteads
for persons with at least fifty percent Hawaiian blood.5 Some
sovereignty groups also contend that the United States government
should pay them at least $10 billion in back rent for the use of their
lands.4
C. The Native Hawaiian Plebiscite
After years of active debate, the Hawaii State Legislature fi-
nally passed a legislative act relating to Hawaiian sovereignty in
1993. The stated purpose of this law was "to acknowledge and
recognize the unique status the Native Hawaiian people bear to the
State of Hawaii and to the United States and to facilitate the efforts
of Native Hawaiians to be governed by an indigenous sovereign
nation of their own choosing. 47
Among other things, this legislation and later amendments
established the Hawaiian Sovereignty Elections Council (HSEC)
and charged it with the responsibility of developing an electoral
mechanism to determine what form Hawaiian sovereignty might
take. Together, these statutes appropriated over $4 million from
the State treasury to accomplish this task.49
Ultimately, HSEC decided to hold a plebiscite to answer the
question: "Shall the Hawaiian people elect delegates to propose a
Native Hawaiian governmentT' HSEC also decided, however, to
limit the right to vote in the Native Hawaiian Plebiscite to (1)
44. See Podgers, supra note t, at 78.
45. See Cox, supra note 35, at 1.
46. See id.
47. 1993 Haw. Sess. Laws 359, § 2.
48. This act was later amended by Act 200 in 1994 and Act 140 in 1996. In
general, these amendments made technical changes and appropriated additional
funds in order to facilitate the accomplishment of Act 359's stated purpose. See 1996
Haw. Sess. Laws 140; 1994 Haw. Sess. Laws 200.
49. See Rice v. Cayetano, 941 F. Supp. 1529, 1535 (D. Haw. 1996).
50. See id. at 1536.
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Hawaiians,"' who (2) were over eighteen years of age on September
2, 1996.52
An estimated 85,000 ballots were sent to registered "Native
Hawaiian" voters, some of whom did not reside in and/or were not
even citizens of either Hawaii or the United States at the time of the
Plebiscite. Approximately 30,000 ballots were returned and counted
using State election computers and resources. Those who voted
overwhelmingly chose to proceed with the Hawaiian sovereignty
movement by a margin of almost three to one.'
II. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES RAISED BY THE
NATIVE HAWAIIAN PLEBISCITE
A. Voting Rights Issues
Within its five subsections, Part II.A first gives background
on Rice v. Cayetano in an effort to provide critical information about
the context in which the topics of this Note were litigated. It
subsequently proceeds to a discussion of the "one person, one
vote" principle that governs the structure of most elections and
then carves out two potential exceptions to that doctrine: a special
purpose district exception and a proposed rule that focuses on the
level of control invested in a constitutionally elected body rather
than the inclusiveness or exclusiveness of the particular initiative.
Finally, Part II.A.5 critiques the logic of the court in Rice v. Cayetano
in applying the special purpose district exception by noting that it
ignored organizational structure and legitimacy factors that other
courts have considered in applying the exception. It continues by
arguing that neither the special purpose district exception or the
proposed rule focusing on the level of control by a constitutionally
elected body works to trump the principle of "one person, one
vote." Because of this, Part II.A ultimately concludes that the
Plebiscite at issue in Rice should have been held unconstitutional.
51. Hawaii State law defines "Hawaiian" as "any descendant of the aboriginal
peoples inhabiting the Hawaiian Islands which exercised sovereignty and subsisted
in the Hawaiian islands in 1778, and which peoples thereafter have continued to
reside in Hawaii." HAW. REV. STAT. § 10-2 (1996). Eligibility to vote in the Native
Hawaiian Plebiscite was determined using this definition. See Rice, 941 F. Supp. at
1536 n.5.
52. See Rice, 941 F. Supp. at 1536.
53. The actual margin was 731/6-27%. See Carey Goldberg, Native Hawaiian Vote
Favors Sovereignty, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 1996, at Al; Move Toward Sovereignty Gains
Momentum in Hawaii, CHARLESTON GAZErTE & DAILY MAIL, Sept. 15, 1996, at 19A
[hereinafter Momentum].
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1. Rice v. Cayetano-A Backdrop for Voting Rights Litigation
Shortly before the announcement of the Native Hawaiian
Sovereignty Plebiscite results, Harold F. Rice, a non-Hawaiian
who was not allowed to vote on the initiative, filed a motion for
preliminary injunction in the United States District Court for the
District of Hawaii. That motion attempted to prevent the an-
nouncement of the Plebiscite's results by contending that the
Plebiscite itself was unconstitutional. Specifically, Rice claimed
that, among other things, the Native Hawaiian Plebiscite violated
his right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment
and his rights to suffrage under the Fifteenth Amendment and
the Voting Rights Act.4
Rice contended that the State's exclusion of non-Native
Hawaiian people from participation in the Sovereignty Plebiscite
was presumptively unconstitutional because it infringed on the
fundamental right to vote."5 In response, the State argued that the
Native Hawaiian Plebiscite was a special purpose election that
could constitutionally be limited to members of the group most
"directly affected" under the Ball v. James" and Salyer Land Co. v.
54. See Rice, 941 F. Supp. at 1536. Rice and his co-plaintiffs (collectively
referred to by the court as the "Kakalia plaintiffs") also brought claims contesting
the constitutionality of the Plebiscite under the Supremacy Clause, the First
Amendment, the Civil Rights Act, and Hawaii State constitutional provisions
dealing with the relationship of Native Hawaiians to the State of Hawaii. Id. The
scope of this Note is limited to voting rights problems that the Sovereignty
Plebiscite raises, however.
The Rice court felt somewhat limited by Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535
(1974), Naliielua v. Hawaii, 795 F. Supp. 1009, 1013 (D. Haw. 1990), aff'd, 940 F.2d
1535 (9th Cir. 1991), and various state and federal statutes that might collectively
be read to stand for "the proposition that Native Hawaiians may be treated
separately in matters affecting their own affairs without violating equal protection
guarantees," Rice, 941 F. Supp. at 1539-44. Because I disagree with the Rice court's
conclusion that the Native Hawaiian Plebiscite substantially affected only Native
Hawaiian affairs, however, I view the limitations set by these cases as irrelevant to
my discussion of the Plebiscite's constitutionality.
For a good discussion of the equal protection and special relationship as-
pects of the sovereignty controversy, refer to Stuart Minor Benjamin, Equal
Protection and the Special Relationship: The Case of Native Hawaiians, 106 YALE L.J.
537 (1996). But see Frickey, supra note 12, 1756-67 (criticizing Benjamin's equal
protection analysis as misfocused and too narrow).
55. See Rice, 941 F. Supp. at 1539 (citing Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993)); see
also Benjamin, supra note 54, at 599-600 (discussing the fact that State funding or
involvement in the sovereignty movement may lead to invalidation of the entire
HSEC process).
56. 451 U.S. 355 (1981).
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Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District7 excections to the "one
person, one vote" standard of Reynolds v. Sims.
2. Reynolds v. Sims-The "One Person, One Vote" Principle
Although the facts of Reynolds dealt with the narrow issue of
legislative apportionment schemes and alleged vote dilution as
they related to the election of Alabama state legislators, subsequent
cases and scholarship have recognized that Reynolds stands for a
much broader proposition known as the "one person, one vote"
principle. 9 Specifically, Reynolds announced that "[flull and
effective participation by all citizens in... government requires...
that each citizen have an equally effective voice . . . ."' Almost by
logical inference, this holding has since been interpreted to mean
not only that vote dilution is unconstitutional, but also that elec-
tions limited to a certain portion of the voting population on the
basis of immutable characteristics are generally unconstitutional
because they effectively deny citizens a "voice" where they are
entitled to have one by the provisions of the Fifteenth Amendment."
But the United States Supreme Court, under a doctrine gen-
erally referred to as the special purpose district exception, has
recognized that the right to participate in elections might be
limited to disproportionately affected groups in cases where these
57. 410 U.S. 719 (1973).
58. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
59. Id. at 536-37.
60. Id. at 565.
61. See, e.g., Salyer Land, 410 U.S. 719 (1973). Compare cases like Seattle Title
Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116 (1928), and Eubank v. City of Richmond, 226 U.S.
137 (1912). Both of these cases involved ordinances that allowed the modification
of zoning plans on the vote of two-thirds of the residents within the district in
question. The Court struck such ordinances as unconstitutional because "part of
the property owners fronting on the block determine the extent of use that other
owners shall make of their lots, and against the restriction [the owners in the
minority] are impotent." Eubank, 226 U.S. at 143. Although these cases are
distinguishable because the ordinances at issue in Eubank and Roberge precluded a
right to judicial review that the plaintiffs in Reynolds obviously had (and that non-
Native Hawaiian residents of the State of Hawaii would also possess), these cases
are interesting because they can be read to show the Supreme Court's unwilling-
ness to let groups of private citizens impose their will on other citizens when it
comes to certain subjects. Cf. City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 426 U.S.
668, 679 (1976) (upholding an ordinance that mandated approval via public
referendum on any changes in land use agreed to by the city council). The Forest
City Court specifically distinguished Eubank and Roberge by noting that the
unconstitutional ordinances in those cases delegated zoning decisions "to a
narrow segment of the community, not to the people at large." Id. at 677.
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groups are specially subjected to some limited governmental
authority that affects a limited land area.62
3. The Special Purpose District Exception
In Salyer Land, the United States Supreme Court upheld a Cali-
fornia voting qualification that restricted the right to participate in
an election for the directors of a water control district based on land
ownership. 2 The Court was persuaded that the restrictions were
constitutional because: (1) the water district had relatively limited
governmental authority; (2) the water district's primary purpose
was to provide for the acquisition, storage, and distribution of water
for farming in a limited area; and (3) its actions disproportionately
affected landowners within the water district." Under those circum-
stances, the Supreme Court applied a rational basis test to the
qualifications and determined that the statutes did not violate the
Equal Protection Clause."
Similarly, in Ball v. James, the United States Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of an Arizona system for electing the
directors of an agricultural improvement and power district that
limited voter eligibility to landowners and apportioned voting
power according to the number of acres owned. In deciding the
case, the Court first observed that the district's purpose was
sufficiently specialized and narrow.67 It therefore went on to
conclude that the district's activities affected landlords and
landowners so disproportionately that it should be released from
the strict demands of the Reynolds "one person, one vote" stan-
dard."
The court in Rice v. Cayetano was convinced by the State of
Hawaii's argument that the Native Hawaiian Sovereignty Plebi-
scite was similar to the limited-participation elections held in both
Salyer Land and Ball because, in the court's eyes, the Plebiscite was
held for a very specific purpose and HSEC was mainly an
"information-gatherer" vested with only limited governmental
authority."
62. See Salyer Land, 410 U.S. at 728-30.
63. See id. at 730-34.
64. See id. at 728-30.
65. See id. at 734-35.
66. See 451 U.S. 355, 367-68 (1981).
67. See id. at 370-71.
68. See id.
69. See 941 F. Supp. 1529, 1545 (D. Haw. 1996).
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This Note disagrees with that conclusion. While it is clear that
the Native Hawaiian Sovereignty Plebiscite "disproportionately
affected" Native Hawaiians, the Rice court seemed to discount the
fact that the results of the Plebiscite might substantially affect many
other Americans, especially Hawaii residents.70 Such an effect puts
this vote outside the Salyer Land and Ball exceptions for special
purpose districts because, although they have been held to apply in
a myriad of circumstances, these exceptions have never been held to
apply to an issue that has the potential to dramatically affect the
society or economy of an entire state, like sovereignty or the disposi-
tion of two million acres of land'
Although the Rice court noted that "there is undoubtedly
some interest and anxiety generated by [the Native Hawaiian
sovereignty movement] among non-Native Hawaiian citizens of the
State," it (1) agreed with the State's attorneys in casting the Plebiscite
as more of an opinion poll, 2 (2) held that the Native Hawaiian
Plebiscite represented a stage too early in the sovereignty process to
substantially affect the citizens of Hawaii,73 and (3) pointed to
language in an amendment to Act 359 that, in its eyes, guaranteed
the protection of the interests of non-Native Hawaiians presently
residing within the State of Hawaii. 74
70. Admittedly, there are many things that might "substantially affect" the entire
population of the United States. The distinction to draw here, however, is whether
that possibility of substantial effect arises out of ways in which a state actor is
organized or whether that possibility can only result from an accident caused by
something like human error or an "act of God." For further discussions on this point,
refer infra to notes 94-99 and their accompanying text.
71. See, e.g., Porterfield v. Van Boening, 744 P.2d 468 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987) (applying
the Salyer Land exception to an irrigation district); State v. Frontier Acres Community
Dev. Dist. Pasco County, 472 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 1985) (community development district);
Stelzel v. South Indian River Water Control Dist., 486 So. 2d 65 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986)
(water control district); Foster v. Sunnyside Valley Irrigation Dist., 687 P.2d 841 (Wash.
1984) (irrigation district); cf Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 397 U.S. 50, 53-54 (1970)
(finding that limited elections were impermissible where governmental functions such
as the right to collect fees and make contracts were implicated).
72. Telephone Interview with John P. Dellera, Deputy Attorney General for the
State of Hawaii and Lead Attorney in Rice v. Cayetano on Behalf of the State (Oct. 31,
1996) [hereinafter Dellera Interview].
73. See Rice, 941 F. Supp. at 1552.
74. That language read:
Nothing arising out of the Hawaiian convention provided for in
this Act, or any result of the ratification vote on proposals from the
Hawaiian convention, shall be applied or interpreted to supersede,
conflict, waive, alter, or affect the constitution, charters, statutes,
laws, rules, regulations, or ordinances of the State of Hawaii or its
political subdivisions.
1994 Haw. Sess. Laws 200, § 14.
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4. Justice Powell's "Political Process" Exception to the
"One Person, One Vote" Standard
Although an argument applying a political process exception
to uphold the constitutionality of the Native Hawaiian Sovereignty
Plebiscite was not raised by the State of Hawaii in its argument
against Harold Rice's motion, this Section explores the possibility
of taking that position. Justice Stevens, in his concurring opinion
in Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa,m noted that the mere fact
that citizens are not allowed to vote in specific elections does not
necessarily mean that they are excluded from the political proc-
ess.7' Instead, "through their state representatives, they participate
directly .... 77 Three years later, in a concurring opinion to the Ball
v. Jamesrs case, Justice Powell clearly delineated the importance of
this form of representation by explaining how such legislative
representation adequately protected the interests of non-voters in
special interest elections. He noted that "we should expect that a
legislature elected on the rule of one person, one vote will be
vigilant to prevent undue concentration of power in the hands of
undemocratic bodies .... [In such a case, we] should allow the
political process to operate," rather than allow the Court to dictate
an election scheme that would detract from democratic processes.'
Justice Powell's opinion can be summarized into the fol-
lowing rule: (1) where the legislature is elected under a one
person/one vote scheme, and (2) has demonstrated its control over
the processes of the governing body of the special purpose district,
limited elections should be allowed-as long as (3) the issues are
salient enough to ensure "that the people will act through their
elected legislature when further changes in the governance of the
District are warranted."'
Justice Powell's "rule," stated in a concurring opinion, is not
binding authority. In fact, Powell's rule probably conflicts with
75. 439 U.S. 60 (1978).
76. See id. at 77 (Stevens, J., concurring); see also Richard Briffault, Who Rules at
Home?: One Person/One Vote and Local Governments, 60 U. CHI. L. REv. 339 (1993)
(discussing the significance of Justice Stevens's concurrence in Holt).
77. Holt, 439 U.S. at 77.
78. See Ball, 451 U.S. at 373-74.
79. Id. at 374; see Jeffrey L. Snyder, Note, Ball v. James and the Rational Basis Test:
An Exception to the One Person-One Vote Rule, 31 AM. U. L. REV. 721 (1982) (giving an
overview and analysis of Justice Powell's concurrence in Ball); Karen Malm Weaver,
Constitutional Law--Fourteenth Amendment-Equal Protection-Ball v. James, 31
EMORY L.J. 201 (1982) (same).
80. Ball, 451 U.S. at 374; see id. 373-74.
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explicit and binding statements made by the court over the years.8'
Nevertheless, it raises an interesting question-should we be con-
cerned about a situation that currently seems to be safely within the
control of the Hawaii State Legislature? The answer in this case is an
unequivocal yes. This is because the Native Hawaiian Plebiscite works
to legitimize the principle of Native Hawaiian sovereignty and leaves
the legislature powerless to do anything about that newly created
legitimacy.' That is, the Plebiscite fails the second prong of Justice
Powell's test because the Hawaii State Legislature does not have
control over its effects. The next subsection expounds on this reason
for concern.
5. Why "One Person, One Vote" Should Be Applied to the
Native Hawaiian Sovereignty Plebiscite
One can only guess at what the positive results of the
Plebiscite mean for the future of Hawaii. HSEC has claimed that the
Plebiscite is a massive victory and a "very big step" forward. 3 But
some have questioned the election's validity because of a low
participation rate," and others have totally rejected the state-
controlled Plebiscite as an illegal attempt to limit Native Hawaiians
in their quest for self-government." One thing, however, is clear-as
a result of the Plebiscite, the State of Hawaii now must fund the
election of delegates for a constitutional convention that will deter-
mine the type of sovereign government that Native Hawaiians
want." The positive result of the Native Hawaiian Sovereignty
81. See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969)
("[T]he deference usually given to the judgment of legislators does not extend to
decisions concerning which resident citizens may participate in the election of
legislators and other public officials.").
82. For a more complete discussion regarding the creation of legitimacy for the
Hawaiian sovereignty movement, refer infra to Part II.A.5.
83. See Teri Sforza, Hawaii's Struggle for Independence, ORANGE COUNTY REGISTER,
Nov. 9,1996, at A14 (quoting Tara Lulani McKenzie, Executive Director of HSEC).
84. See Hawaiian Vote: A Signal for Caution, HONOLULU ADVERTISER, Sept. 12,
1996, at A12 (observing that only 40% of the 85,000 ballots mailed out were re-
turned).
85. See Expires, supra note 11, at 1 (quoting Kekuni Blaisdell, leader of Ka
Pakaukau: "[w]e... reject the state's hewa (wrong) process of predetermination for a
puppet government; and we join our kanaka maoli people's pono (right) process for
self-determination under international law"); Ballots Burned in Protest of Hawaiian
Plebiscite, ASSOC. PRESS POL. SERv., July 22, 1996, at 1, available in 1996 WL 5394756.
86. See Pennybacker, supra note 32, at 21; Momentum, supra note 53, at 19A. HSEC
"estimates it will cost $1.1 million to hold the election and $7.2 million to hold the
convention." ASSOC. PRESS POL. SERV., Dec. 12, 1996, at 1, available in 1996 WL
5427490.
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Plebiscite has started "an irreversible negotiating process, with
unpredictable consequences."
Unless the constitutional convention is a meaningless exercise,
the efficacy of the Act 200 language protecting the interests of non-
Hawaiians that the Rice Court points to is highly questionable." It
would seem that, by definition (i.e., because of the collective goals of
the sovereignty groups), a "productive" sovereignty convention
would conflict with at least some of the social, economic, and
political interests belonging to the State of Hawaii and its non-
Hawaiian residents. Either the language of Act 200 or the goals of
the convention will be compromised. That is, unless the convention
is to be a meaningless exercise spouting sovereignty reforms that
cannot ever legally be approved, significant and snowballing
momentum toward substantial change is already developing.
Given the history the Native Hawaiian sovereignty move-
ment, the control of the Hawaii State Legislature over the
movement is precarious at best. To begin with, most Hawaiian
sovereignty groups (including the two largest, Ka Lahui Hawai'i
and Pu'uhonua) and even some legal commentators reject the
notion that the legislature has any control over whether Native
Hawaiians declare independence or what the form and/or
boundaries of an independent Native Hawaiian government might
be. Francis A. Boyle states:
Clearly, Hawaii has the right under international law
to declare itself an independent nation .... There's
no way to avoid dealing with that. It's not going to
go away. It's just going to gain more and more mo-
mentum .... [T]he Native Hawaiians have a right to
self-determination that has never been exercised. 9
In recent years, Native Hawaiians have asserted those rights
to self-government with increasing frequency. For example, both
87. Pertman, supra note 30, at 1.
88. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
89. Sforza, supra note 83, at A14 (quoting Boyle in a newspaper interview); see
also Trask, supra note 23, at 91-94 (discussing Native Hawaiian claims to independ-
ence under established international law); Podgers, supra note t, at 76 (quoting
Professor Richard Falk from the Princeton University Center of International Studies:
"It can... be concluded as a matter of law [that Native Hawaiians] never relin-
quished, in any appropriate and binding form, their right to self-determination
under international law").
For a deeper discussion of Native Hawaiian claims to sovereignty and repa-
rations under international law and provisions that are protective of human rights,
refer to TRASK, supra note 15, at 31-86; S. James Anaya, The Native Hawaiian People
and International Human Rights Law: Toward a Remedy for Past and Continuing Wrongs,
28 GA. L. REV. 309 (1994).
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independent families and groups of Hawaiians have begun to erect
"tent cities" on beaches in an attempt to occupy lands that they claim
as rightfully belonging to them, and both Ka Lahui Hawai'i and
Pu'uhonua have already established their own constitutions and
governments.90 Such assertions of independence have even seen
some success. Recently, the United States Navy returned a site that it
had used for some of its bombing exercises-i.e., the sacred island of
Kaho'olawe-to the ownership of the Native Hawaiians.9'
Poka Laenui, the leader of another self-proclaimed independ-
ent nation of Native Hawaiians has observed that
[r]esistance to the "occupying colonial power" is
mounting .... In the schools, children are refusing to
join in the morning flag Pledge of Allegiance to the
United States. People are refusing to file tax returns or
to pay income taxes. More and more defendants
charged with criminal offenses are denyinj the jurisdic-
tion of the American courts over them ....
The future HSEC elections present a problem that cannot be
analyzed within our current legal paradigms. That is, one could
construct a good argument that Justice Powell's rule should apply
today, when the Hawaii State Legislature seems to have adequate
control over the campaign for self-government. But each future
election is likely to stir up more controversy and more news
coverage, thereby creating more legitimacy and more momentum
for the sovereignty process. 93 Judging by the recent examples of
resistance and assertions of Native Hawaiian independence, it
seems reasonable to conclude that at some point, the sovereignty
movement may grow to proportions beyond the control of both the
federal government and the Hawaii State Legislature. It therefore
fails the second prong of Justice Powell's test and the Plebiscite
cannot be excepted from the rigors of the "one person, one vote"
standard.
The Rice court would try to have us believe that the Native
Hawaiian Plebiscite is as inconsequential to most Americans as the
water control district in Salyer Land or the agricultural improve-
ment district in Ball. But even if this Note has overstated the
"legitimacy effect" of the Plebiscite and it is true that all the
currently feasible effects of sovereignty are inconsequential, the
90. See Pennybacker, supra note 32, at 21.
91. See Guy Trebay, The State of Aloha: Hawaiian Culture Elbows Its Way onto the
World Stage, VILLAGE VOICE, May 13, 1997, at 32.
92. Sforza, supra note 83, at A14.
93. See infra note 115 and accompanying text.
SPRING 1998]
Michigan Journal of Race & Law
Rice court still misses a major distinguishing factor that renders the
special purpose district exception inapplicable to the Native
Hawaiian Sovereignty Plebiscite-courts have approved special
purpose district elections only in circumstances where the election
cannot be said to have a realistic chance of significantly affecting a
wide segment of the population.
In Collins v. Brennan," for example, the Court applied the spe-
cial purpose district exception to a referendum on a sewer project
that failed to include non-resident property owners. While it is
remotely possible that the sewer approved in Collins could overflow,
such an incident would be an almost unpreventable accident-most
likely either an act of God or the work of disgruntled employees or
human error.
On the other side of the line are cases like Hadley v. Junior
College District.95 There, the Supreme Court rejected the application
of the special purpose district exception because the entity in
question had the power to collect fees and issue bonds. That is, the
exception was held not to apply because the junior college district
had powers that could purposefully be used by the entity to affect
groups other than those who were entitled to select the members of
the board that governed the district.
Although such a distinction might seem arbitrary, it is similar
to that drawn in other circumstances. In Federal Election Commission
v. NRA Political Victory Fund,9 for example, the D.C. Circuit held
unconstitutional an attempt by Congress to place non-voting
members onto the Federal Election Commission (FEC). Instead of
inquiring into the likelihood that Congress would use this power to
exert an impermissible influence on the voting members of the
FEC,9 the court immediately held that this was a violation of the
separation of powers norm. This result can be interpreted in light of
Hadley to show that where only a purposeful, rather than an acciden-
tal and almost unpreventable, action separates structured situations
from unconstitutionality, the law establishing the structure of that
situation is unconstitutional.98
94. 456 N.Y.S.2d 931 (Sup. Ct. 1982).
95. 397 U.S. 50, 54 (1970).
96. 6 F.3d 821 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
97. As an aside, even more than the possibility of sovereignty for Native
Hawaiians, the possibility of such unconstitutional influence was extraordinarily
remote because the non-voting members were meant to be "observers:' and their
interference would probably be construed as unethical, if not illegal.
98. See also Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1987) (holding unconstitutional a
structural scheme that granted Congress the power to remove an executive officer
in spite of a total lack of evidence to suggest that Congress would use its power to
exert impermissible influences).
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The Native Hawaiian Sovereignty Plebiscite represents a
circumstance that is closer to Political Victory and Hadley rather
than Collins because it represents a very significant (albeit the
first) step toward Native Hawaiian sovereignty, a change that has
the present potential-however remote-to dramatically affect
the lives of many.9
But the Plebiscite is also problematic because its structure ba-
sically groups Native Hawaiians with a potentially impermissible
ideological gerrymander that would give them an unfair advantage
in the political process.'m In cases like Shaw v. Reno ("Shaw r"), 0
Miller v. Johnson, °2 Shaw v. Hunt ("Shaw I/"),Io and Bush v. Vera,"1 for
example, the Supreme Court has held unconstitutional redistricting
plans meant to assist groups that had been empirically proven to be
historically disadvantaged and underrepresented.'9 The plans that
99. Cf. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 469 (1953) (finding what were effectively
"White primary" elections to violate the Fifteenth Amendment because they
excluded African American citizens from participating in "an integral part, indeed
the only effective part, of the elective process that determines who shall rule and
govern in this country").
100. Although the Supreme Court has traditionally been more cautious of
groupings established on the basis of race and more accepting of groupings based
on politics, a number of scholars have noted that there is a distinct linkage
between both politics and race. See Pamela S. Karlan, Our Separatism? Voting
Rights As an American Nationalities Policy, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 83, 92-94 (arguing
that Blacks have a distinct political viewpoint because their viewpoints are colored
by their social experiences and interactions).
Irrespective of whether Professor Karlan is right or not, it is difficult to
deny the connection between race and politics in this context; there is a high
correlation between being Native Hawaiian and one's stance on the issue of
whether Native Hawaiians should have a right to self-governance. It is therefore
easy to believe that the Supreme Court would be concerned about the type of
grouping that the Native Hawaiian Sovereignty Plebiscite effects.
101. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
102. 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
103. 116 S. Ct. 1894 (1996).
104. 116 S. Ct. 1941 (1996).
105. See Bush, 116 S. Ct. at 1962; Shaw II, 116 S. Ct. at 1902-03; Miller, 515 U.S. at
920-22; Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 647-49 (justifying such a decision because of expressive
harms-i.e., a promotion of the belief that "members of the same racial group ...
think alike, share the same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates
at the polls"-and threats to the structure of representative democracy-i.e., that
"elected officials are more likely to believe that their primary obligation is to
represent only the members of that group, rather than the constituency as a
whole").
Professor Pam Karlan argues, however, that in attempting to prevent cer-
tain expressive harms, the Court has really promoted even more invidious ones.
Besides denigrating the political choices to affiliate along racial lines that are made
by Black voters, Karlan says that the Court's expressive harms rationale assumes
that being placed in a setting where they do not constitute the dominant group
somehow injures Whites. See Pamela S. Karlan, Still Hazy After All These Years:
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were found unconstitutional in these cases used race-conscious
redistricting-in the form of geographically based gerrymanders-
to eliminate non-minority populations from the districts in question
with the express purpose of increasing the possibility of electoral
success for minority candidates in those districts (i.e., increasing
minority representation in decision-making bodies).
16
The Native Hawaiian Sovereignty Plebiscite can also-with a
little stretching-be cast as this type of unconstitutional gerry-
mander °7 Although it is not geographically based, the Plebiscite
works like the redistricting plans in Shaw I, Miller, Shaw II, and
Bush because it cuts out most oppositional interests and ideologies
by simply disallowing them any political voice. °' In doing so, it
Voting Rights in the Post-Shaw Era, 26 CUMB. L. REv. 287, 293 (1996); Shaw II, 116 S.
Ct. at 1908 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Professor Karlan also rejects the validity of the Court's second rationale by
observing that the justification perniciously assumes that legislators who are
elected out of predominantly minority communities are less fair or responsive
than their counterparts who are elected by White constituents. See Pamela S.
Karlan & Daryl J. Levinson, Why Voting Is Different, 84 CAL. L. REv. 1201, 1217-19
(1996).
106. See Bush, 116 S. Ct. at 1956-57; Shaw II, 116 S. Ct. at 1899; Miller, 515 U.S. at
907-08; Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 635; cf. Shaw II, 116 S. Ct. at 1904 (noting that the
"maximization" of minority voting strength does not constitute a compelling
governmental interest under the terms of the Voting Rights Act).
107. But cf. Lani Guinier, Groups, Representation, and Race-Conscious Districting: A
Case of the Emperor's Clothes, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1589 (1993). In that article, Professor
Guinier contends that redistricting plans like the ones at issue in Shaw and its
progeny do not constitute gerrymanders at all, much less unconstitutional ones. See
id. at 1593 n.18. This is because those redistricting plans do not "arbitrarily allocate
disproportionate political power" to any group. See id. at 1593 (emphasis added).
Rather, Guinier argues that those plans were directed at a specific, constitutional
purpose-remedying a long history of racial exclusion and disenfranchisement. See
id. at 1593 n.18.
Many scholars disagree with this characterization, however. Professor Robert
Dixon, for example, has noted that "all districting is gerrymandering." ROBERT G.
DIXON, JR., DEMOcRATIc REPRESENTATION: REAPPORTIONMENT IN LAw AND POLTCS
462 (1968). He notes that this is true because "[a] near infinite number of sets of
'equal' districts may be drawn in any state; each set, however, [has] a quite different
effect in terms of overall party balance and minority representation" Id.
108. See Bush, 116 S. Ct. at 1956 ("[T]o the extent that race is used as a proxy for
political characteristics, a racial stereotype requiring strict scrutiny is in operation.").
But cf. id. at 1954 ("We have not subjected political gerrymandering to strict scrutiny.")
(emphasis added); Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 147 (1986) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (noting that "purely political gerrymandering claims" are not justicable)
(emphasis added).
In Bush itself, the Supreme Court describes the line between these two con-
trasting ideas:
If the State's goal is otherwise constitutional political gerryman-
dering, it is free to use the kind of political data on which Justice
Stevens focuses-precinct general election voting patterns, precinct
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enhances the possibilities for the electoral success of "minority" ideals.
Such success, I argue, in turn creates legitimacy for the principle of
Hawaiian sovereignty and thereby works to increase the sovereignty
movement's chances for success in the overall political process.
Whether awarding this advantage to a historically oppressed
and underrepresented group like the Native Hawaiians is actually
distressing depends largely on your political and philosophical
perspectives. Later, in Part Ill.C.2 for example, I argue that some
form of head start for Native Hawaiians may be warranted in the
name of leveling the playing field. In any case, this same type of
coalition-building head start occurs, in some senses, whenever
Gallup or Times/Mirror takes an opinion poll because people are
less hesitant to support a movement that they know will not be a
waste of their time and their vote.
Remember, however, that Gallup and Times/Mirror are pri-
vately funded entities. Because of the Fourteenth Amendment's state
action requirement, an unconstitutional election occurs only where
the public funds a limited election that does not meet the special
purpose district exception."" Other forms of limited polling are
constitutionally permitted. Moreover, political process advantages
for any group, including those that have been historically oppressed,
may also be problematic because of the Supreme Court's recent
stance against such head starts that has been espoused in cases
following the Shaw v. Reno"' and Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena'
lines of case law.
In any case, a third line of argumentation may also render the
Rice court's approach incorrect. Although courts have decided that
the single purpose district exception can be applied to limit the
range of individuals who are eligible to sign an original petition
asking that a special purpose district be created,"' there is an exception
primary voting patterns, and legislators' experience-to achieve
that goal regardless of its awareness of its racial implications and
regardless of the fact that it does so in the context of a majority-
minority district.
Bush, 116 S. Ct. at 1956 (citations omitted). The overlap between race and political
ideologies apparent in the issue of the Native Hawaiian Sovereignty Plebiscite makes
the side of the line that the Plebiscite lies on somewhat unclear.
109. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5; Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922,
924 (1982) ("Because the [Fourteenth] Amendment is directed at the states, it can be
violated only by conduct that may be fairly characterized as 'state action.' ").
110. 509 U.S. 630(1993).
111. 515 U.S. 200 (1995). For a discussion of how Adarand and cases related to it
can be read to prohibit the types of racial preferences that the sovereignty plebiscite
extends to Native Hawaiians, refer infra to Part II.B.1.
112. See, e.g., Gillard v. Estrella Dells I Improvement Dist., 541 P.2d 932 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1975); Doenges v. City of Salt Lake City, 614 P.2d 1237 (Utah 1980).
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to this general rule. If the result of a successful petition would be a
vote by the full electorate, then the special purpose district exception
cannot constitutionally be applied." While the Plebiscite at issue is
not-in form or substance-such a petition, these cases bring to light
the realization that it is simply insufficient for the Rice court to
answer organizational structure and legitimacy concerns about the
Plebiscite by noting that the initiative represents a stage too early in
the process to make any substantial difference in the outcome. The
court cannot simply assume away these problems by assuming that
subsequent elections will be held with a broader voter base when
"14necessary.
If the Native Hawaiian Plebiscite was only meant to be an
opinion poll of Native Hawaiians, it was unnecessary because it
was already known that there are many Native Hawaiians backing
the sovereignty movement-the over forty active sovereignty
groups boasting a collective membership greatly exceeding the
30,000 voters polled in the Plebiscite make that fact clear to most
Hawaiians, if not many Americans. The real question is whether
those Native Hawaiians, who are too small a group to cause such
dramatic political change by themselves, can create political
coalitions and convince a broad base of non-Hawaiians to join
them in their quest for self-governance.
Instead, I argue that the Native Hawaiian Plebiscite was an
attempt to gain funding and legitimacy for the principle of Native
Hawaiian sovereignty through the support of the government of the
State of Hawaii and an "official" election."' The measure approved
by the Plebiscite could have also been approved by the Hawaii
State Legislature, HSEC, a coalition of sovereignty groups, or
through any number of other mechanisms. But that would mean
that the legitimacy to be gained by holding an official election
would be lost. Moreover, the Supreme Court has consistently held
that even if a political process can be carried out through other
means (e.g., appointment, legislative decision), when a government
decides to open the process to an election, the election must be made
113. See Hayward v. Clay, 573 F.2d 187, 189-90 (4th Cir. 1978) (justifying this rule
by concluding that one group cannot be allowed to control the full electorate's ability
to vote); City of Seattle v. State, 694 P.2d 641, 648 (Wash. 1985).
114. See Rice v. Cayetano, 941 F. Supp. 1529, 1552 (D. Haw. 1996).
115. See, e.g., Pennybacker, supra note 32, at 21, 23 (quoting Honolulu attorney
and Native Hawaiian sovereignty activist Haydn Aluli as noting that the Plebiscite
has caught the attention of many and "influence[d] the east coast urban centers on
the mainland,' thereby giving the sovereignty movement some of the mainstream
voices that it needs to gain the attention, if not the support, of powerful policy-
makers).
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open to all eligible voters and conform to the constitutional require-
ments of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments."6
In the past, some courts have allowed limited-participation
elections on specific issues."7 But I have been hard pressed to find
any examples of valid limited-participation elections that decided
broad-based social principles.' 8 In fact, both case law and the
propositions voted on in the November 1996 elections seem to
indicate just the opposite"-when social principles have any real
possibility of being altered by a referendum or plebiscite, a broad-
based election is warranted. For example, in Hadley v. Junior College
District,'20 the court applied the "one person, one vote" standard to the
election of trustees for a community college district because those
trustees "exercised general governmental powers' 2' and "perform[ed]
important governmental functions"'2 that had a significant effect on
all citizens residing within the district.
116. See, e.g., Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968) (holding that the "one
person, one vote" principle of Reynolds v. Sims applies to the election of a Commis-
sioners Court, even though such a court could have been appointed, rather than
elected).
117. See, e.g., Arizona Farmworkers Union v. Agricultural Employment Relations
Bd., 712 P.2d 960 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985) (immunizing a limited election concerning a
union representation district from the "one person, one vote" principle); Goldstein v.
Mitchell, 494 N.E.2d 914 (IMl. App. Ct. 1986) (applying the single purpose district
exception to uphold a limited election concerning a drainage district); Lane v. Oyster
Bay, 603 N.Y.S.2d 53 (App. Div. 1993) (allowing a vote concerning the extension of a
sanitation collection district to be limited to freeholders); Collins v. Brennan, 456
N.Y.S.2d 931 (Sup. Ct. 1982) (approving a referendum election on a sewer project
that failed to include non-resident property owners).
118. By "broad-based social principles:' I mean the types of ideas that have
some real potential to change the structure of society. I believe that Native
Hawaiian sovereignty is such an idea because, if successful, it would result in at
least the appropriation of a substantial amount of land within the existing State of
Hawaii and, at most, could change the entire structure of the Hawaiian govern-
ment.
In defining the parameters of a permissible limited-participation election,
Professor Richard Briffault takes an alternative approach and draws a line between
the proprietary and legislative functions of government. Only "[p]roprietary
governments may use assessment-based voting, acreage-based voting, or even one
owner/one vote for qualified owners." Briffault, supra note 76, at 369. On the other
hand, modalities of government that decide legislative issues are limited by the
principle of "one person, one vote" in designing their elections. Thus, even under
Professor Briffault's test, the Native Hawaiian Sovereignty Plebiscite could not
qualify as a special purpose district elfction.
119. See, e.g., Pear, supra note 2 (discussing initiatives and propositions on the
ballot in various states during the November 1996 elections).
120. 397 U.S. 50 (1970).
121. Id. at 53.
122. Id. at 54. Among the "important governmental functions" cited by the Court
are the power to make contracts, collect fees, and issue bonds. Id. at 53. Since Native
American tribes with reservations are given these powers, it might easily be
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Similarly, in Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15,'73 the
United States Supreme Court invalidated a statute restricting
participation in school board elections to the parents of school
children and the owners or lessors of taxable real property. The
Court reached this conclusion despite the fact that the parents of
school children were obviously more directly affected by most of the
actions that the school board might consider.'2 Fumalaro v. Chicago
Board of Education,12' a case dealing with a similar issue (i.e., the
disenfranchisement of part of the voting population for the purpose
of school board elections), explains that all members of society
should be allowed to elect school board members because "the
operation of our schools is a fundamental governmental activity in
which all members of society have an interest.,
126
In a similar fashion, although the issue of whether doctors
can prescribe marijuana for chronic pain directly affects only a
small percentage of the population (i.e., presumably only a small
percentage of the population will ever be able to get a marijuana
prescription), because the partial legalization of marijuana could
dramatically affect the structure of society, a broad-based referen-
dum or initiative (or direct action by the legislature) rather than a
limited special purpose election, is required for approval.'27 The
wide-ranging effects that Hawaiian self-governance could poten-
tially have on society puts the Native Hawaiian Sovereignty
Plebiscite in a class with elections concerning school boards and
the partial legalization of marijuana-not water control and
agricultural improvement.
B. The Equal Protection Clause-Does it Change This
Voting Rights Analysis?
In Rice v. Cayetano,'2 United States District Judge David Alan
Ezra noted that "[w]hile there is undoubtedly a racial component
to the voter qualifications for the Native Hawaiian Vote, the
emphasis here is placed on the Native Hawaiian community as
one targeted for 'rehabilitation' and special consideration by
presumed that sovereign Native Hawaiians could potentially enjoy these powers as
well.
123. 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
124. See id. at 631.
125. 566 N.E.2d 1283 (111. 1990).
126. Id. at 1298.
127. Broad-based initiatives regarding this subject were on the ballot in both
California (Proposition 215) and Arizona (Proposition 200) on November 5, 1996. See
Pear, supra note 2.
128. 941 F. Supp. 1529 (D. Haw. 1996).
[VOL. 3:475
Native Hawaiian Sovereignty Plebiscite
Congress.""' Although Judge Ezra misconstrues congressional intent
because Native Hawaiians are incapable of constitutionally receiving
"special consideration by Congress,"' his idea raises an interesting
question. Can a limited participation sovereignty plebiscite be
justified on the grounds that Native Hawaiians are a minority group
that historically has been oppressed and wronged in a situation
analogous to that seen in affirmative action, vote dilution, and
majority-minority district cases? That is, can these doctrines preserve
the constitutionality of a plebiscite that cannot be saved by either
the special purpose district exception or Justice Powell's political
process exception?
1. Analogies to Affirmative Action
An analogy to affirmative action conceptualizes the Native
Hawaii Sovereignty Plebiscite as a type of special preference that
attempts to correct a past wrong hindering current progress.
Specifically, it argues that the Plebiscite recognizes that the depriva-
tion of the right to self-determination from Native Hawaiians has
also denied them opportunities to participate in the political process.
It uses a limited election in an attempt to return self-determination
to these individuals.
Justice Marshall provides support for this vision by noting
that "[a] profound difference separates governmental actions that
themselves are racist, and governmental actions that seek to remedy
the effects of prior racism... .",2 This difference may be especially
true in the Fifteenth Amendment context because the right to vote is
paradigmatic of the right to participate in the political process-a
right that the court explicitly sought to protect for minorities like
Native Hawaiians in United States v. Carolene Products.In Marshall's
129. Id. at 1541.
130. See supra note 54; see also, e.g., Benjamin, supra note 54, at 540 ("[T]here is no
'special relationship' between Native Hawaiians and the federal government
pursuant to which programs singling out Native Hawaiians would be subject to
rational basis review.").
131. Cf. Randall Kennedy, Persuasion and Distrust, in RACIAL PREFERENCE AND
RACIAL JuSTICE 45, 50-51 (Russell Nieli ed., 1991) (arguing that affirmative action is
necessary to provide a remedy for past discrimination).
132. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 551-52 (1989) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
133. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (noting that a "more searching judicial inquiry"
may be undertaken where the interests of "discrete and insular minorities" are at
stake). Justice Powell has said that the primary theoretical interpretation of this
footnote is that
the Supreme Court has two special missions in our scheme of gov-
ernment: [f]irst, to clear away impediments to participation, and
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premise has gained significant support on the current court,'3 and
could potentially be good law-even if it might only be applicable in
the context of educational institutions.135
But more recent Supreme Court decisions in the affirmative
action context indicate that preferences for historically oppressed
ensure that all groups can equally engage in the political process; and
[s]econd, to review with heightened scrutiny legislation inimical to
discrete and insular minorities who are unable to protect themselves
in the legislative process.
Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Carolene Products Revisited, 82 COLuM. L. REv. 1087, 1089 (1982);
see also JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 75-77 (1980) (interpreting this
famous footnote to require access to the political process for minorities).
134. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 947-48 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(noting that legislation enacted for the purpose of protecting minorities is
fundamentally different from, and less needful of strict scrutiny than action taken
to advance the interests of the White majority); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 243 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("There is no moral or
constitutional equivalence between a policy that is designed to perpetuate a caste
system and one that seeks to eradicate racial subordination."); Lincoln Caplan et
al., The Hopwood Effect Kicks In on Campus, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 23, 1996,
at 26, 27-28 ("[Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer] have argued that
there is a clear distinction under the Constitution between racial classifications
designed to help minorities and those that discriminate against them."); see also
Melissa L. Saunders, Equal Protection, Class Legislation, and Colorblindness, 96 MICH.
L. REv. 245, 246 & n.6 (1997) (noting that two past Justices, White and Blackmun,
have also argued for a distinction between remedial and invidious racial classifi-
cations).
135. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 317-18 (1978)
(stating that race can be considered as a "plus" factor in admissions); id. at 307
(observing that race has sometimes been allowed as a consideration where a prior
history of discrimination based on race exists); Univ. and Community College Sys. of
Nevada v. Farmer, 930 P.2d 730 (Nev. 1997) (overturning a jury verdict in favor of a
White female college professor whose hiring was deferred for a year so that the
University of Nevada could hire a Black man for a position in its sociology depart-
ment), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1186 (1998). But see Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson,
122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir.) (upholding a California proposition striking all racial
preferences against constitutional scrutiny), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 397 (1997); Board
of Educ. of Piscataway v. Taxman, 91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc) (striking an
affirmative action plan preferring minority teachers over non-minority teachers in
layoff decisions where teachers are equally qualified; holding that affirmative action
can never be valid except to remedy instances of proven discrimination), cert.
granted, 117 S. Ct. 2506, cert. dismissed, 118 S. Ct. 595 (1997); Hopwood v. Texas, 78
F.3d 932, 940 (5th Cir. 1996) (dealing with an affirmative action admissions policy
devised by the University of Texas, the court noted: "there is now absolutely no
doubt that courts are to employ strict scrutiny when evaluating all racial classifica-
tions, including those characterized by their proponents as 'benign' or 'remedial' "),
cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996); id. at 940 n.17 (noting that Adarand overruled Metro
Broadcasting "insofar as it applied intermediate scrutiny to congressionally mandated
'benign' racial classifications"). The contrasting results of cases like Farmer and
Taxman promote considerable confusion about the law of affirmative action in the
context of educational institutions. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Same-Sex Harassment
Furrows Brow of Court, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 1998, at A14.
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groups like Native Hawaiians are unconstitutional. In Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, for example, the Court held that "all
governmental action based on race.., should be subjected to [strict
scrutiny]"' 3' and explicitly noted that "holding 'benign' state and
federal classifications to different standards" is contrary to the ideals
of the Fourteenth Amendment.'37 This, Justice Thomas has said, is
because "[so-called 'benign' discrimination teaches many that
because of chronic and apparently immutable handicaps, minorities
cannot compete with them without their patronizing indulgence. ,
138
Thus, it is unlikely that the Native Hawaiian Sovereignty Plebiscite
could be saved by an affirmative action argument.
2. Vote Dilution and Majority-Minority District Cases
Cases directly concerning the Fifteenth Amendment/Voting
Rights Act arena also raise doubts as to whether Marshall's con-
ception of the Equal Protection Clause applies there.' 39 Miller v.
Johnson, for example, can be read to express the Supreme Court's
reluctance to allow Fifteenth Amendment considerations to trump
Fourteenth Amendment protections.'4 Older cases in the vote
136. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227.
137. Id.; see also Croson, 488 U.S. at 494 ("[T]he standard of review under the
Equal Protection Clause is not dependent on the race of those burdened or
benefited by a particular classification."); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S.
267, 273 (1986) ("[Tlhe level of scrutiny does not change merely because the
challenged classification operates against a group that historically has not been
subject to governmental discrimination."). But cf. Frank H. Easterbrook, Abstraction
and Authority, 59 U. CI. L. REv. 349, 356-58 (1992) (noting the confusion in the
Court's Equal Protection doctrine); Michael Klarman, An Interpretive History of
Modern Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L. REV. 213, 315-16 (1991) ("[T]he Court's recent
hostility toward affirmative action [as well as its adoption of strict scrutiny for
racial preferences benefiting persons of color] ... seems inconsistent with the strict
constructionist constitutional philosophy that many of the Justices purport to
espouse.").
138. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 241 (Thomas, J., concurring).
139. See supra note 132 and accompanying text; see also Chapin Cimino, Comment,
Class-Based Preferences in Affirmative Action Programs After Miller v. Johnson: A Race-
Neutral Option, or Subterfuge?, 64 U. CI. L. REv. 1289,1293-94 (1997) (observing that
recent decisions involving race redistricting could eliminate all affirmative action,
including programs based on socioeconomic preferences).
140. See Miller, 515 U.S. at 904-05 (noting that any redistricting using race as a
"predominant factor" triggers strict scrutiny); see also Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941,
1951 (1996) ("For strict scrutiny to apply, the plaintiffs must prove that other,
legitimate districting principles were 'subordinated' to race."); Shaw v. Hunt, 116 S.
Ct. 1894, 1904 (1996) (finding that a "maximization" of minority voting strength
cannot constitute a "compelling governmental interest" that meets the demands of
strict scrutiny).
Collectively, these cases may indicate that the historical oppression of
Native Hawaiians cannot justify limited elections which might bolster their
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dilution context indicate that race can be used as a determinative
factor in redistricting where findings show "that the political
processes leading to nomination and election [are] not equally
open to participation by the group in question-that its members
[have] less opportunity than . .. other residents in the district to
participate in the political processes and to elect legislators of their
choice.",'4' But, even though these cases have not been directly
overruled, their vitality is threatened by Shaw v. Reno"' and its
progeny. That is, cases like Shaw make it doubtful that a history of
racial oppression and practical disfranchisement could be used to
justify a plebiscite that was not otherwise justified by the special
purpose district exception.
I. FINDING AN ADEQUATE SOLUTION
Because I conclude that (1) more elections concerning sover-
eignty are likely, (2) the special purpose district exception fails to
validate the current plebiscite mechanism, and (3) generalized
equal protection doctrines are questionably-or maybe even
doubtfully-applicable, an alternative to the Plebiscite is required.
Obvious constitutional solutions would involve either limiting the
decision-making process to the legislature itself, or opening the
decision-making process to all residents of Hawaii.'43
ability to succeed within the political process. See supra notes 101-108 and
accompanying text (discussing the possible impermissibility of "ideological
gerrymanders" that use race as a proxy for political ideology).
141. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 766 (1973) (citing Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403
U.S. 124, 149-50 (1971)); see also South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308
(1966) (finding that one of the fundamental goals of the Voting Rights Act was to
"banish the blight of racial discrimination in voting;' and to provide remedies for
voting discrimination "where it persists on a pervasive scale.").
The intersection of equal protection and voting rights in the race-as-a-
redistricting-factor context spans a body of issues and jurisprudence too broad to
be dealt with adequately in the context of the Native Hawaiian Plebiscite. For a
deeper treatment of these problems, refer to T. Alexander Aleinkoff & Samuel
Issacharoff, Race and Redistricting: Drawing Constitutional Lines After Shaw v. Reno,
92 MICH. L. REv. 588, 592 (1993); Laughlin McDonald, Can Minority Voting Rights
Survive Miller v. Johnson, 1 MICH. J. RACE & L. 119 (1996); Richard H. Pildes,
Principled Limitations on Racial and Partisan Redistricting, 106 YALE L.J. 2505 (1997);
Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Bizarre Districts," and
Voting Rights: Evaluating Election District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH.
L. REV. 483 (1993).
142. 509 U.S. 630 (1993) (finding districts drawn with solely racial motivations to
invoke strict scrutiny). Cases following Shaw have further limited the use of race to
justify preferences in voting. See supra note 140.
143. In this second option, I imagine that ballot questions would be formulated
by the lieutenant governor's office (the lieutenant governor is in charge of State
elections in Hawaii) and voted on by all eligible residents of the State.
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But in both of these situations, the process takes on a pater-
nalistic feeling because Native Hawaiians would have little say in
how they would be governed and would be denied their right to
self-determination (Hawaiians make up approximately twenty
percent of all residents and are not significantly represented-at
least as a racial group-in the Hawaii State Legislature).'" It
therefore becomes imperative to search for an even better fix.
A. Step One-Deciding Whether to Emphasize
"Process" or "Substance"
An old folktale of American jurisprudence has Judge Learned
Hand accompanying Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes on his way to
the courthouse and saying in farewell, "Do justice!" only to be
reprimanded by Justice Holmes who retorted, "That is not my job.
My job is to apply the law."'' 5 While both humorous and ironic, this
story encapsulates an ongoing and hotly contested debate in legal
circles: given a trade-off between "process" and "substance," should
A third alternative, of questionable constitutionality, would be to limit the
boundaries of a sovereign Hawaiian nation to the funds and trust lands currently
under the control of the Office of Hawaiian Affairs (OHA), and then allow OHA to
administer any elections and constitutional conventions that might be necessary to
reach Hawaiian sovereignty. See 80-8 Op. Haw. Att'y Gen. (1980) (finding the
limitation of the franchise to Native Hawaiians in OHA elections constitutional
because OHA's limited governmental authority and structure meet the Salyer Land
exception). But see Benjamin, supra note 54, at 610 (questioning the constitutional-
ity of OHA itself).
Since elections run under the control of OHA evoke the same Fifteenth
Amendment questions as the Native Hawaiian Plebiscite, and since OHA is itself
of questionable constitutionality, it is unlikely that this third alternative would be
any more constitutional (or advantageous) than the current HSEC election process.
144. See also Derrick A. Bell, Jr., The Referendum: Democracy's Barrier to Racial
Equality, 54 WASH. L. REV. 1, 25 (1978) ("[I]n a particular referendum on a particular
issue, a matter extremely harmful to minority interests but only moderately
beneficial to non-minority interests may be passed; the ballot does not easily register
intensity of interest as the legislative process does."); cf. DONALD G. SAARI, GEOMETRY
OF VOTING 13 (1994) (running through a set of mathematical proofs that indicate "the
commonly used plurality vote turns out to be one of the wors[t] methods that could
ever be adopted"). But cf. Kenneth 0. May, A Set of Independent, Necessary, and
Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision, 20 EcONOMETRICA 680, 683 (1952)
(proving, mathematically, that majority rule is the only decision-making principle
capable of meeting basic conditions of fairness and rationality without privileging
the status quo).
145. Michael Herz, Do Justice!: Variations of a Thrice-Told Tale, 82 VA. L. REV. 111,
114 & n.9 (1996) (quoting Learned Hand, A Personal Confession, in THE SPIRIT OF
LIBERTY 302, 306-07 (Irving Dilliard ed., 3d ed. 1960)). But see J. Skelly Wright,
Professor Bickel, the Scholarly Tradition, and the Supreme Court, 84 HARV. L. REV. 769,
797 (1971) ("The ultimate test of the Justices' work, I suggest, must be good-
ness .
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process be subverted in order to reach just results? Or should
process be followed strictly and result-oriented paradigms be cast
aside?4
One need look only as far as the nearest administrative law
casebook to determine that the American legal system has emphasized
the importance of process and the structure of government.17 Doc-
trines of standing, timing, and reviewability, for example, all limit the
right to adjudication without regard to the substantive merits of the*. . 148
dispute. Moreover, within the Native Hawaiian sovereignty context
specifically, Professor Laurence Tribe asserts that the importance of
constitutional structure works to deny Native Hawaiians adjudication
based on the substantive merits. He notes that "[tihe concept that
statehood 'is a permanent fix is probably as deeply ingrained an idea
as any you can find in the Constitution. . . .Once something
becomes a state, the idea that there can be some consensual parting
of the ways seems quite troubling.' ,149
Even the Carolene Products footnote, often used to protect the
rights of "discrete and insular minorities" in the name of substantive
justice, ' may really emphasize the importance of process. Professor
John Hart Ely observes that it
ask[s] us to focus not on whether this or that substantive
value is unusually important or fundamental, but rather
on whether the opportunity to participate either in the
political process by which values are appropriately
identified and accommodated, or in the accommodation
146. Compare, e.g., OUTSIDE THE LAW, supra note 1 (collecting personal narra-
tives and short essays on the definition of justice; commonly emphasizing
substance and results over process and structure) and Mitchell F. Crusto, Shattering
the Pseudo-Conservative Federalism Paradigm: Federalism, Liberty, and Civil Rights, 49
HASTINGS L.J. (forthcoming 1998) (arguing that civil rights should prevail over
legal provisions protecting the structure of government) with ALEXANDER M.
BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS (1970) (contending that
process and access are enough to fulfill constitutional guarantees) and ELY, supra
note 130, at 44-70 (arguing that, because "justice" and our conception of rights
changes over time, the only sensible solution is to depend on a process which
renders consistent results).
147. See, e.g., STEPHEN G. BREYER & RICHARD B. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIvE LAW
AND REGULATORY POLICY: PROBLEMS, TEXT, AND CASES (1992).
148. See, e.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 822 (1985) (concluding that review
of the substantive merits of the action was precluded because enforceability of
statute was committed to agency discretion); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 741
(1972) (denying standing to plaintiffs and failing to consider the actual merits of their
claim); Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 448 (1907)
(deciding to wait for agency administrative action before taking up a review of
substantive issues).
149. Podgers, supra note t, at 76 (quoting Professor Tribe).
150. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
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those processes have reached, has been unduly con-
stricted.'51
Indicting the courts of the United States for always emphasiz-
ing the importance of "process" over "substance" would be unfair,
however. In Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, for
example, the Supreme Court upheld a statute criminalizing statutory
rape by male-but not female-perpetrators because of California's
substantial interest in preventing adolescent pregnancy.5 2 Even here,
however, when the interest at stake is one that most Americans
agree is important, it is telling to note that a substantial minority of
the Court criticized the approach emphasizing substantive concerns:
I fear that the [other opinions] reach the opposite re-
sult by placing too much emphasis on the desirability
of achieving the State's asserted statutory goal-
prevention of teenage pregnancy-and not enough
emphasis on the fundamental question of whether the
sex-based discrimination in the California statute is
substantially related to the achievement of that goal.20
Professors Mari Matsuda and Charles Lawrence note that
this "[o]bsession with precision puts the demands of arithmetic
before the demands ofjustice, ignoring the more central goals of
stability and fairness."' When the law loses sight of the ideals it is
intended to protect, the law becomes sterile, formalistic, and
unjust.iu The early matter of Johnson v. M'Intosh,' dealing with
151. ELY, supra note 130, at 77.
152. 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
153. Id. at 488-89 (Brennan, J., dissenting). That both Justices White and Marshall
joined in Brennan's opinion and agreed with his statement indicates that the
commitment to process is neither a stereotypically "liberal" nor "conservative" view.
154. LAWRENCE & MATSUDA, supra note 31, at 239. In his forthcoming article,
Professor Mitchell F. Crusto warns that a strict adherence to process may also be
dangerous because such an approach ignores unjust substantive results that may
follow when processes are contorted. Crusto, supra note 146. By analyzing cases in
a myriad of contexts from civil rights and voting rights to abortion and habeas
corpus, Professor Crusto first demonstrates that the Supreme Court's recent use of
the federalism doctrine strays far from the original intent of deference to state and
local governments that Justice O'Connor espoused in Gregory v. Ashcroft. Id.
(citing Gregory, 501 U.S. 452, 457, 463 (1991)). He then goes on to observe that
federalism (in its mutated form) has been used to justify "anti-rights decisions."
Id.; see also, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (demonstrating
the Court's contorted usage of governmental structure and process-in the form of
"military necessity"-to justify the war-time internment of thousands of Japanese
Americans without the use of due process).
155. See PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 139 (1991); see
also id. ("Living solely according to the letter of the law means that we live without
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claims to land based on prior Native American ownership, starkly
makes this point. Although the Supreme Court noted that the
result of denying the existence of good title in the original Native
American occupants was unjust, it rationalized its decision by
noting that "[clonquest gives a title which the Courts of the con-
queror cannot deny, whatever the private and speculative opinions
of individuals may be, respecting the original justice of the claim
which has been successfully asserted."15
Given the result of Johnson, now almost universally viewed
as unjust, it is easy to sympathize with positions like those taken
by Professors Matsuda and Lawrence. But Professor Ely makes a
similarly good argument in noting that because our fundamental
values are ever-changing and hard to identify, we must depend on
process to vindicate the interests of American society.'-, That is, can
we ever-in a manner consistent with constitutional norms-agree
on what a "just" result entails, especially considering that the result
stands for all time? Take, for example, Native American sover-
eignty-the area at issue in Johnson. Even if most agree that Johnson
itself was unjust, there is large disagreement about what "just"
result is now mandated to right that wrong.159
Further substantiating Ely's point is the reality of the Native
Hawaiian sovereignty debate. Although one might think that the
United States's admission of fault 6 would provide clear insight
into what the "just" result is, Sam Slom, the president of Small
Business Hawaii, contends otherwise:
I don't believe that any segment of the population is
entitled to reparations ... because we've got a prob-
lem of fixing responsibility if there in fact was a wrong
done to a group of people or to individuals. I think
that you have a problem with time and you have a
problem with responsibility. I[,] for example, don't
spirit, that one can do anything one wants to as long as it complies in a technical
sense.").
156. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
157. Id. at 588.
158. See ELY, supra note 130, at 70.
159. See Timothy Egan, Backlash Growing as Indians Make a Stand for Sovereignty,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1998, at Al. Egan quotes James Thompson, a small businessman
in Crow Agency, Montana as noting, "I didn't persecute anybody at Plymouth
Rock .... This is the 1990s. We didn't do anything to them, and we don't owe them
anything." Id. Later in the article, United States Senator Slade Gorton, a Republican
from Washington, speaks out against the proposed expansion of Native American
sovereign rights: "Citizens of the United States should not have their rights limited
by separate governments within the United States." Id.
160. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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feel responsible for problems that happened long be-
fore I was here and able to do something about them. I
would be responsible if there is something I see now
or that I contribute to. But I think it's unfair to try and
force people living today to pay for a wrong which
may have been committed by their ancestors or per-
haps by someone with whom they have no connection
at all.'16
Because ideas of justice are hard things to form consensus
on, "substance," acting alone, forms an unsuitable basis for the
design of a representational process. Some scholars suggest that
the Constitution and justice only require that barriers preventing
access to the political process by persons of color be removed.! 2
But acknowledging reality, Professor Ely contends that process, in
and of itself, is not enough either: "[n]o matter how open the
process, those with most of the votes are in a position to vote
themselves advantages at the expense of the others, or otherwise to
refuse to take their interests into account."'6' In other words,
striking the proper balance between "process" and "substance"
involves giving political minorities a voice without overwhelming
or excluding those in the political majority.
B. The Proposed Process
This means that the more democratic alternative'" would
utilize the political party-type structure that groups like Ka Lahui
161. Matsuda, supra note 30, at 372 n.209 (quoting from Hawaiian Reparations:
Three Points of View, KA WAI OLA 0 OHA, Feb. 1986, at 1); see also Yamamoto, supra
note 30, at 41 (observing that many Chinese Americans whose families have lived
in Hawaii for four or five generations feel that apologies and reparations are
unnecessary because they did nothing wrong). The current struggles of the
Hawaiian economy, illustrated by dwindling welfare payments and skyrocketing
consumer prices, see Martin Kasindorf, Hard Times in Hawaii, USA TODAY, Nov. 7,
1997, at 17A, may lead more residents of Hawaii to adopt these anti-Hawaiian
viewpoints.
162. See, e.g., BICKEL, supra note 146, at 37.
163. ELY, supra note 130, at 135.
164. I use the term "democratic alternative" here to indicate that I recognize other
constitutional alternatives exist, see supra note 143 and accompanying text, but
choose to design a process that is both constitutional and reflective of the democratic
principles driving the original plebiscite (i.e., direct democracy). Cf. Romer v. Evans,
517 U.S. 620, 647 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing a referendum as the "most
democratic of procedures"); City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 426 U.S. 668,
672 (1976) ("[AIll power derives from the people, who can delegate it to representa-
tive instruments which they create. In establishing legislative bodies, the people can
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Hawai'i, Pu 'uhonua, and Ka Pakaukau have adopted and give them a
position in the Hawaiian political process. 68 This Note suggests the
following: in the first phase of its proposed system, these groups,
and presumably any others who wanted the opportunity, would
be given the chance to submit proposals for what resources they
want to be made available to an independent Hawaiian nation,
disregarding the question of how they will use those resources for
now. 6For example, a proposal could potentially exist of the things
that many sovereignty groups generally agree Native Hawaiians
deserve: (1) some form of independent government; (2) the return
of approximately two million acres of land within the current
boundaries of the State of Hawaii to the control of Native Hawai-
ians; and (3) ten billion dollars in back rent for the use of lands that
they feel rightfully belong to Hawaiians.16 Another proposal could
simply recommend that the status quo be preserved by allocating
no additional resources to Native Hawaiians and continuing non-
recognition of any Native Hawaiian sovereign state. With over
forty sovereignty groups and one million interested parties (i.e.,
the residents of Hawaii), one can imagine that the proposals would
be numerous and varied."
reserve to themselves power to deal directly with matters which might otherwise be
assigned to the legislature.") (citation omitted).
Note, however, that some scholars contend that all plebiscites (and other
tools of direct democracy) should be seen as unconstitutional under the Guarantee
Clause. See Hans A. Linde, When Initiative Lawmaking is Not "Republican Government":
The Campaign Against Homosexuality, 72 OR. L. REv. 19, 20 (1993); Catherine A. Rogers
& David L. Faigman, "And to the Republic for Which It Stands": Guaranteeing a
Republican Form of Government, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1057, 1072 (1996).
165. See HAWAIIAN SOVEREIGNTY ELECTIONS COuNcIL, REPORT TO THE LEGIS-
LATURE 13 (1995) ("Some Hawaiian organizations have developed constitutions,
position papers, and master plans for sovereignty or independence. In essence these
organizations are political parties, each earnestly advancing their own platforms.
These organizations are self-appointed. They have not received the consent of the
Hawaiian people, as a whole, to be their government*").
166. Although allowing racially defined groups like Ka Lahui Hawai'i to propose
the level of resources that should be made available to an independent Hawaiian
nation may raise some constitutional issues, see infra, discussion at Part Ill.C.1, it is a
practical necessity of sorts because only Native Hawaiians (or residents of the
independent Hawaiian nation) can know what resources they want.
167. But see Streshinsky, supra note 13, at T5 ("There are almost as many opinions
about sovereignty as there are people with some degree of Hawaiian blood."); Cox,
supra note 35, at 1.
168. One article notes that pleas for Native Hawaiian sovereignty include
everything from homestead associations seeking legally promised, but long-delayed,
parcels of trust lands to groups calling for the full restoration of the Hawaiian
National Government and/or the monarchy. See Cox, supra note 34, at 1; see also
supra, discussion at Part I.B (reviewing the wish-lists of various sovereignty groups).
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The next phase of the proposed process would utilize the
HSEC bureaucracy'6 and the funds allocated to it (some two
million dollars of funds remain) to (1) pare down these proposals
into no more than ten specific ballot proposals-rejecting utterly
frivolous ones, consolidating ones that look virtually the same,
eliminating others that are weeded out in the political process-
and (2) work with other agencies to specify lands and budget
dollars that would be given to the independent Hawaiian nation
under these proposals. Presumably, HSEC would do this through
a series of public hearings that would allow individuals to
question both the efficacy and constitutionality of the sovereignty
proposals and allow groups to defend and refine their proposals.
While the discretion to choose proposals would generally remain
with HSEC, I would impose one restriction: all decisions must
meet the requirements of administrative legitimacy.'
70
169. Delegation to an administrative agency is a wise maneuver for several
reasons beyond HSEC's existing bureaucratic structure. First, the allocation of land
in the Hawaiian sovereignty context represents an allocation of both concentrated
benefits and concentrated burdens. See JAMES Q. WILSON, POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS
335-36 (1973). In such a situation, a legislature is not only likely to side-step the
difficult choices that need to be made, but is wise to do so; the time-consuming and
resource-intensive negotiations necessary to resolve situations where concentrated
interests battle each other are better left to specialized bodies that can give more
attention to the problem. See id. at 336; see also Steven P. Croley, Making Rules: An
Introduction, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1511 (1995):
The necessity of legislative delegation stems, in part, from the collec-
tive action problems Congress faces. Because individual legislators
have their own personal sets of interests, goals, and ambitions, and
because these do not always overlap with the interests, goals, and
ambitions of Congress collectively, single members seldom have
powerful incentives to contribute to-what are for Congress as a
whole-collective goods. More concretely, individual members of
Congress typically have little incentive to invest the resources neces-
sary to become experts ....
Id. at 1526. But see Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448
U.S. 607, 687 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) ("It is the hard choices... which must
be made by [Congress].") (emphasis added).
Delegation also makes good use of HSEC's familiarity with many of the
various sovereignty proposals and its expertise in dealing with sovereignty issues
and, perhaps more importantly, sovereignty groups.
170. Although a discussion about the administrative minutiae of the proposed
system is not the purpose of this Note, it is worth pointing out that any legitimate
process has several prerequisites. Decision-making processes in American
government are grounded in a process of reasoned elaboration. See HENRY M.
HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF THE LAW 143-52 (1994). That is, there is an expecta-
tion of consistent procedure allowing for the consideration of relevant factors and
an expectation of a connection between an analysis of those factors and the policy
produced. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
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In the third phase of the process, these revised proposals will
be submitted to the public during a general election in which all
residents of Hawaii will vote using a modified Borda count proce-
dure. Under this modified Borda count procedure, each voter
would take the list of ten sovereignty alternatives prepared by
HSEC and rank his or her top thee choices in order of prefer-
ence.'7' The voter's top choice would be given three points, his
second preference two points, and his third preference one point."3
In the end, each voter's list of preferences is tallied, and the option
receiving the largest number of total points wins."3 Although it
would certainly be easier to have the legislature decide on a pro-
posal to implement, one plausible reading of the Hawaii State
Constitution indicates that the release of any State lands to an
independent Native Hawaiian nation may require amendment of
the constitution (a process requiring approval by all residents of
the State anyway).' Thus, rather than running into the possible
quandary of having the legislature approve a particular solution
and then having the general public turn it down when they
463 U.S. 29 (1983) (reversing an agency alteration of policy that failed to explain
the reasons for its decision or consider all reasonable alternatives); SEC v. Chenery
Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943) (rejecting an agency decision that had no rational basis in
law or the agency's expertise); United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prod. Corp., 568
F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1977) (chastising an agency for concealing basis the basis for its
decisions and failing to address the relevant concerns of involved parties).
Legal procedures should also be informed (all relevant information should be
obtained), deliberative (a full interchange of views and arguments among the
competing interests should take place), and efficient (proposals should be disposed
of in the time available). See HART & SACKS, supra, at 695 (noting that "the needs of
efficiency may interfere with the ideals of information and deliberation").
171. An election using the normal Borda count procedure has the voter rank all
alternatives. See Jean-Pierre Benoit & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Assembly-Based Prefer-
ences, Candidate-Based Procedures, and the Voting Rights Act, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1503,
1522 n.44 (1995) (describing the normal Borda count procedure); Mayer G. Freed et
al., Unions, Fairness, and the Conundrums of Collective Choice, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 461, 522
(1983) (discussing the normal process of the Borda count).
172. This modification to the normal Borda count procedure is necessary because
of the administrative convenience and informational problems that arise when too
many possible alternatives are available. For example, this modified Borda count
procedure is very similar to the one used by Major League Baseball for determining
the winner of the Rookie of the Year award (because there are simply too many
rookies, voters are asked to rank the three most deserving). See Claire Smith,
Garciaparra Is Named Top Rookie in Landslide, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1997, at C2. It is also
similar to an alternative voting procedure initially considered by the San Francisco
Board of Supervisors last year. See Diana Walsh, Supervisors Ponder New Voting
Scheme: Activists Say Change Should Bring More Minorities Aboard, S.F. EXAMINER, Dec.
11, 1995, at A2.
173. Benoit & Kornhauser, supra note 171, at 1522 n.44; Freed et al., supra note 171,
at 552.
174. See Pennybacker, supra note 32, at 21.
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consider it in conjunction with a constitutional amendment, it
makes more sense to simply combine the approval process.
In addition, opening an election to the general public has
the "democratic" effect of allowing all interested residents of
Hawaii to have some say in deciding how sovereignty will affect
their own lives."' But conducting an election under the traditional
American plurality/winner-take-all system in this context poses
special problems. In particular, mathematicians and political
scientists have found that in elections where the number of major
issues or candidates rises above two, the chances that the most
popular issue or candidate will not win increase greatly. 76 This
"paradox" arises in situations with multiple options because (1)
similar options tend to split support between themselves, or (2) in
situations where people have only one vote, they are unlikely to
"waste" it on an unrealistic (but actual) preference.'7 Since this
sovereignty election is likely to have (1) a number of controversial
proposals on the ballot, (2) critical effects that are more wide-ranging
over a large segment of Hawaii's population, and (3) results that are
more difficult to reverse than the effects of normal candidate or issue
elections, it is highly desirable to have a system, such as the modi-
fied Borda count, that reduces the Vossibility of anything but the
most popular alternative prevailing. 7
175. It is significant to note that many residents of Hawaii view Native
Hawaiians as entitled to some compensation for their maltreatment by the United
States and Hawaii. See Matsuda, supra note 30, at 372 & n.208; Sforza, supra note
83, at A14. Thus, while a general election would undoubtedly temper some of the
more radical proposals, it would probably not have the effect of eliminating the
possibility of any compensation at all.
Even if that were the result, however, this alternative process gives the
Native Hawaiian sovereignty movement all that it is constitutionally entitled to
(i.e., access to the political process). Cf. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 83
(1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting that the Constitution does not guarantee
that minorities will prevail in political contests; it merely grants them equal access
to the political process and an equal opportunity to prevail in such contests).
176. See Kenneth J. Arrow, The Principle of Rationality in Collective Decisions, in
SOCIAL CHOICE AND JUSTICE 45 (1983); Kathy Sawyer, A Paradox of Majority Politics,
WASH. POST, Oct. 9, 1995, at A3.
177. For a real-life example of a voting paradox, reference the 1970 New York
senatorial election where the conservative candidate won, even though over 60%
of the voters would have preferred one of the two more liberal candidates. See
SAARI, supra note 144, at 1; see also K.C. Cole, Vetoing the Way We Vote: Blame
America's Electoral Woes on How We Pick Our Leaders, Mathematicians Say, L.A.
TIMES, Aug. 16, 1995, at 1, available in 1995 WL 9817639 (claiming that by
"dumping winner-take-all pluralities for other methods:' apathy, extremism, and
misjudging may be reduced).
178. Professor Donald Saari has mathematically proven that the Borda count
voting system has the advantages of, among other things, minimizing: (1) the
number and kinds of paradoxes that can occur; (2) the likelihood of any paradox
occurring; (3) the likelihood that a small group could successfully manipulate the
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The Borda count system is not perfect. To begin with, it favors
those who can list at least three preferences, "since their list will
amount to a greater number of points and thus have a more signifi-
cant impact on the outcome." Moreover, like most alternative
voting systems, the Borda count voting procedure will probably
have difficulty in being understood and accepted as democratic.' In
fact, acceptance of Borda count voting in Hawaii is likely to become
a problem because there is little, if any, perceived need for a change
in voting practices."'
Because of this, I also strongly considered using an
"approval voting" system to determine the boundaries and breadth
of the independent Hawaiian nation. Under an "approval voting"
regime, voters are allowed to cast a vote for any and every alterna-
tive that they consider acceptable, and the option that is
"approved" by the largest number of voters wins.1 2 This system
has the desirable advantages of (1) giving voters the total freedom
to express all of their true preferences-i.e., vote for all acceptable
alternatives without fear of wasting a vote on a sure loser-and, (2)
ensuring that the option with the greatest overall support will
win.18
Ultimately, choosing the right voting system is a close call-
truly proving that "Arrow's impossibility theorem" (hypothesizing
that no democratic voting system can be completely fair) holds
true today.'T But the overriding consideration in choosing a struc-
ture for this election is to ensure that the popular will prevails, 3 and
outcome of an election; and (4) the possibility of voting errors adversely changing
the outcome of the election. SAARI, supra note 144, at 14.
179. Freed et al., supra note 171, at 522.
180. Cf., e.g., Richard H. Pildes & Kristen A. Donoghue, Cumulative Voting in the
United States, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 241, 282-85 (discussing these comprehension and
acceptance problems in the context of the cumulative voting procedure used in
Chilton County, Alabama). At least part of the perception of the Borda count as an
undemocratic system rises from its rejection of pure majority rule. For a statement
regarding why deviations from the traditional American philosophy of majoritari-
anism should not be troubling--and indeed may be advantageous-see Luis
Fuentes-Rohwer, The Emptiness of Majority Rule, 1 MICH. J. RACE & L. 195 (1996).
181. Cf. Pildes & Donoghue, supra note 180, at 283-84 (noting that cumulative
voting was generally accepted in Chilton County in spite of its perceived faults, but
only because it was also seen as needed to combat another, more pressing, evil-
minority underrepresentation).
182. See Sawyer, supra note 176, at A3.
183. See id.
184. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Values and Collective Decision Making, in SOCIAL CHOICE
AND JUSTICE 52, 71-77 (1983); see also Cole, supra note 177, at 1 (discussing Arrow's
impossibility theorem).
185. See SAARI, supra note 144, at 9 ("The ultimate goal is to choose a procedure
that always honors the beliefs of the voters.").
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Donald Saari, a mathematician at Northwestern University, has
determined that Borda counts produce the fewest contradictions and
voting paradoxes."
Finally, if and when the voters of Hawaii agree to give Native
Hawaiians some package of resources with which they can con-
struct their independent nation, the State of Hawaii should then
step out of the picture and allow Native Hawaiians to determine
for themselves what the structure of their government will look
like and exactly how their allocated resources will be distrib-
uted.' 8
With over forty sovereignty groups and a much larger
number of perspectives on what sovereignty should look like, it
is clear that Native Hawaiians will have a difficult time allocating
these resources-no matter what the general population ultimately
decides to give to them. In the first place, however, such an alloca-
tion of resources is no more difficult than the choices that sovereign
governments around the world face everyday. More importantly,
it is necessary that Native Hawaiians-rather than the State of
Hawaii or its residents-make distributional decisions in order to
assert and preserve their newly garnered right to self-
determination.
Thus, the entire process is geared toward three things: (1)
allowing Native Hawaiians and other interested parties to propose
boundaries on the Native Hawaiian right to self-government; (2)
allowing the residents of Hawaii to ultimately determine what
those boundaries will be; and (3) allowing Native Hawaiians to
accomplish whatever they wish within those boundaries.
186. See id. at 13-14 (1994).
187. Having the State of Hawaii step out of the process at this point may also
be necessary to preserve the constitutionality of the scheme. See Benjamin, supra
note 54, at 600; id. at 600 n.259 ("If the state were not involved, a referendum of
other process leading toward the creation of an independent Native Hawaiian
organization would, of course, raise no constitutional issues; it would stand on the
same footing as any other private election to the governing board of a private
entity.").
It is also possible to allow the State (in the form of HSEC) to remain in
the process and proceed with (1) the election of delegates to a convention to
allocate the resources of the independent Hawaiian nation, (2) a constitutional
convention, and (3) a ratification vote concerning the convention's proposed
constitution. While this would probably be constitutional and have the positive
effect of organizing the process and limiting conflicts between the Native
Hawaiian sovereignty groups, it would also probably create litigation on the same
grounds as Rice v. Cayetano that would further slow the eventual establishment
of the independent Hawaiian nation. Because of this, I think the costs of
involvement by the State of Hawaii at this fourth phase outweigh any benefits
that might accrue.
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C. Potential Constitutional Problems & Possible Solutions'"
1. Fifteenth Amendment Concerns
The major problem with HSEC's decision-making process is
that it violates the Fifteenth Amendment insofar as it does not
permit all substantially affected persons to have a say in what
Native Hawaiian sovereignty will be like. In reality, however, the
Fifteenth Amendment only raises concerns with regard to one of
the two components constituting the proposed system. That
component is the one represented in the first three phases of the
process and concerns the boundaries, jurisdiction, and breadth of a
Hawaiian sovereign nation. Fifteenth Amendment concerns arise
here because these issues directly involve all residents of Hawaii
(and, potentially, the entire nation). That is, whether Pearl Harbor
belongs to the United States government or the Hawaiian sover-
eign nation, does not only substantially affect Native Hawaiians.
The second component, represented in the last phase of the pro-
posed process, does not raise such Fifteenth Amendment concerns
because it primarily concerns only the form and structure of a
Hawaiian sovereign nation, and disproportionately affects only
Native Hawaiians. That is, whether Native Hawaiians decide to
allow tourists on their parcels of land has a far greater effect on the
Native Hawaiians themselves.'"
The proposed decision-making process recognizes the sepa-
rable nature of these two components and tackles the Fifteenth
Amendment problem by opening up democratic processes with
188. There is at least one non-constitutional, but nevertheless pressing, problem
inherent in the proposed alternative. It stems from the possibility that voters will be
unable to intelligently choose three proposals that they like from 10 relatively
complex alternatives. Cf. THOMAS CRONIN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS OF
INmATIVE, REFERENDUM, AND RECALL 74-75 (1989); Richard B. Collins & Dale
Oesterle, Structuring the Ballot Initiative: Procedures that Do and Don't Work, 66 U.
CoLO. L. REv. 47, 91-92 (1995); David Magleby, Let the Voters Decide?: An Assessment
of the Initiative and Referendum Process, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 13, 31-34 (1995).
In the first place, this problem will probably be no more severe than what-
ever problems arise from inundating California voters with a multitude of complex
initiatives and a thick booklet explaining them. More honestly, however, this
informational problem is probably not solvable. Cf. supra note 177 and accompany-
ing text (discussing "Arrow's impossibility theorem"). My answer, then, is that
although the Borda count method is not perfect, it remains the best method for
ensuring that the public's will is served in this process.
189. Undoubtedly, there will be some unforeseen disputes about what items are
"boundaries, jurisdiction, and breadth" and what items are "form and structure '
These will be left to HSEC (and the courts, if necessary) to resolve, using the
"substantially affecting all residents/substantially affecting only Native Hawaiians"
dichotomy as a guiding principle.
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respect to questions that substantially affect everyone involved
(i.e., where the Constitution requires that they be open), but
allowing limited elections and/or special purpose districts where
issues disproportionately affect Native Hawaiians (i.e., where Ball
and Salyer Land say they are permitted).
2. The White Primary Problem
Recognizing sovereignty groups like Ka Lahui Hawai'i and
Pu'uhonua (which are, for all intensive purposes, racially defined) as
political parties with the power to place proposals on the ballot may
seem similar to some of the practices that were held unconstitutional
in the White primary cases-i.e., limiting participation in the prelimi-
nary phases of an electoral process solely on the basis of race.'" For
example, in Terry v. Adams,"' the U.S. Supreme Court found that the
primary elections held by the Jaybird Party in Texas violated the
Fifteenth Amendment because they excluded African Americans from
participating in "an integral part, indeed the only effective part, of the
elective process that determines who shall rule and govern in this
country."'
192
Several arguments counter this position, however. To begin
with, it is highly unlikely that the power to merely propose solutions
will determine what proposal is accepted in the same way that the
Jaybird Party primary in Terry determined the winner of Texas
elections. After these groups make their proposals, they will be
scrutinized by HSEC, at public hearings, and finally by the general
public. Although some of these checks, such as a general election,
existed in the case of Terry v. Adams, this case is fundamentally
different because (1) Native Hawaiians do not hold the same type of
dominance that the Jaybird party did, and (2) even if they did, there
will be ten proposals, not just one candidate, coming out of the part
of the process controlled by the sovereignty groups.
Unlike the powerful White, Jaybird majority in Terry, Native
Hawaiians are outnumbered, four to one, by the other residents of
Hawaii. Perhaps even more importantly, Native Hawaiians have
historically been underrepresented in Hawaii State Government. In
fact, the whole reason and need for giving Hawaiians the power to
propose and implement ideas about what their sovereign govern-
ment should look like is precisely because they are a minority group
that has historically been oppressed and wronged.'93
190. See supra note 165 (likening sovereignty groups to political parties).
191. 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
192. Id. at 469.
193. But see supra discussion at Part II.B.1 & 2.
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More suspicious is the last phase of the process-where only
Native Hawaiians will have a voice in determining the form and
structure of their independent nation. This part of the process is
undoubtedly more like the Jaybird primary in Terry because it is "an
integral part ... of the elective process that determines who shall
rule and govern.... ."' To begin with, however, the constitutionality
of this final phase is ensured by the judgments of several federal
courts holding that Native Hawaiians may be treated separately in
matters affecting their own affairs without violating equal protection
guarantees. 195
Moreover, as explained previously, while the first three
phases of the process, which determine the boundaries, jurisdiction,
and breadth of the Hawaiian nation, directly affect all residents of
Hawaii, the last phase of the process-determining the form and
structure of the independent Hawaiian nation-allows Native
Hawaiians to resolve a matter that ultimately affects only "their own
affairs." As a result, participation in the last phase of this process can
be constitutionally limited to Native Hawaiians under the Salyer
Land doctrine.196
CONCLUSION
Upon the denial of his motion for a preliminary injunction in
Hawaii's Federal District Court, Harold Rice immediately filed a
motion to stay the district court's judgment with the United State
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.' Although the Ninth Circuit
denied that motion without opinion, Hawaii State Deputy Attorney
General John P. Dellera (lead attorney for the Defendant State of
Hawaii in Rice v. Cayetano) believed that the Ninth Circuit denied the
194. Terry, 345 U.S. at 469.
195. Rice v. Cayetano, 941 F. Supp. 1529, 1540-41 (D. Haw. 1996) (citing Morton
v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974), and Naliielua v. Hawaii, 795 F. Supp. 1009, 1013 (D.
Haw. 1990), aff'd, 940 F.2d 1535 (9th Cir. 1991)). But see Benjamin, supra note 54
(noting generally that Mancari should be read to limit rational basis review of special
preference programs to Native Americans and that Rice & Naliielua have misinter-
preted Mancar).
Although I disagree with the Rice Court's application of Mancari & Naliielua
to the Native Hawaiian Sovereignty Plebiscite itself, because the alternative solution
proposed here adequately limits areas where only Native Hawaiians are allowed to
participate in the political process to those areas where only Native Hawaiians are
substantially affected, the Naliielua rule is appropriately applied to the process that
this Note proposes.
196. See supra discussion at Part Ill.C.1 (explaining why the Salyer Land exception
applies to the fourth phase of the alternative process, but not the first three phases or
the HSEC process).
197. Dellera Interview, supra note 72.
[VOL. 3:475
Native Hawaiian Sovereignty Plebiscite
motion because it saw Rice's claim as having no chance of success on
the merits.9 '
A strict adherence to the language of Salyer Land may allow for
such a conclusion. Deciding to hold a constitutional convention
concerning issues of Hawaiian sovereignty in itself (1) extends very
limited governmental authority to the participants, (2) does not
necessarily allow convention participants to affect any area, much
less a limited one, and (3) is disproportionately meaningful to
Native Hawaiians. 9
But such a holding clearly violates the spirit of the special
purpose district exception. The Native Hawaiian Sovereignty
Plebiscite is distinct from the board of directors election in Salyer
Land because it legitimizes a principle (i.e., Native Hawaiian sover-
eignty) that has dramatic implications for many more people than
just the 30,000 voters who decided its legitimacy. By calling the
Plebiscite a special purpose election and allowing the State of
Hawaii to limit participation in the Plebiscite, the federal courts
deciding Rice v. Cayetano have downplayed the important role that
legitimacy plays in the decision-making process. They have also
abridged the constitutional right of over ninety-nine percent of
Hawaii's residents to voice their opinions on an issue that certainly
plays a central role in determining their future. Such an abrogation is
not permitted by either the "one person, one vote" principle or by
doctrines focused on ameliorating the plight of the historically
oppressed.
While many non-Native Hawaiians are directly affected by the
boundaries, jurisdiction, and breadth of Hawaiian sovereignty,
however, only Native Hawaiians should be allowed to determine
the form and structure of their sovereign government because only
they are significantly affected by that government. Resolving this
tension mandates a bifurcated decision-making process-all citizens
should have a say in the allocation of resources to the cause of
Hawaiian sovereignty, but only Native Hawaiians interested in
sovereignty should command those resources. The procedure
outlined in this Note gives but one option and I am humble enough
to know that it is far from flawless. But the lesson motivating the
procedure's design is too important to be missed: successfully
asking that the life of Hawaii's lands always be preserved in right-
eousness-Ua mau ke ea o ka aina i ka pono-first involves reconciling
198. See id.
199, See Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719,
730-34 (1973) (finding that a limited-participation election was constitutional where
the elections concerned a body (1) with limited governmental authority, (2) govern-
ing a very limited area, and (3) disproportionately affecting the voters in the
election).
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the conflicting American and Hawaiian conceptions of what
"righteousness" is. A workable and legitimate procedure can ill
afford to ignore either perspective any longer.
